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Protecting computer networks from intrusions is more important than ever for our
privacy, economy, and national security. Seemingly a month does not pass without news
of a major data breach involving sensitive personal identity, financial, medical, trade
secret, or national security data. Democratic processes can now be potentially
compromised through breaches of electronic voting systems. As ever more devices,
including medical machines, automobiles, and control systems for critical infrastructure
are increasingly networked, human life is also more at risk from cyber-attacks. Research
into Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) began several decades ago and IDSs are still a
mainstay of computer and network protection and continue to evolve. However,
detecting previously unseen, or zero-day, threats is still an elusive goal. Many
commercial IDS deployments still use misuse detection based on known threat
signatures. Systems utilizing anomaly detection have shown great promise to detect
previously unseen threats in academic research. But their success has been limited in
large part due to the excessive number of false positives that they produce.
This research demonstrates that false positives can be better minimized, while
maintaining detection accuracy, by combining Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) and
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) as classifiers within the context of a situation awareness
framework. This research was performed using the University of New South Wales Network Based 2015 (UNSW-NB15) data set which is more representative of
contemporary cyber-attack and normal network traffic than older data sets typically used
in IDS research. It is shown that this approach provides better results than either HMM
or ELM alone and with a lower False Positive Rate (FPR) than other comparable
approaches that also used the UNSW-NB15 data set.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are a collection of hardware and software
resources that can detect, analyze, and report indications of intrusions in computer
systems and networks. Extending from IDS research, there are Intrusion Prevention
Systems and Intrusion Response Systems focused on the prevention and response aspects
of intrusions respectively (Inayat, Gani, Anuar, Khan, & Anwar, 2016). Some IDSs can
be used in-line to both detect indications of and prevent intrusions in near real-time and
are sometimes referred to as Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems. In other cases,
these systems can communicate with other security devices such as firewalls, which
monitor and control network traffic into and out of a protected network, to automatically
implement blocking rules in response to detection.
Research into IDSs began several decades ago with a key paper on computer
threat monitoring and surveillance, based on mainframe audit logs, by Anderson (1980).
The concept of intrusion detection analysis existed prior to Anderson’s report but
typically just consisted of system administrators manually scanning audit logs for
anomalies. Yost (2015) reported that Clyde began work in 1977 on a limited scope
commercial IDS, named Control, but that effort was not considered as influential or
comprehensive as Anderson’s analysis.
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Initially, intrusion detection was focused on after-the-fact batch analysis of audit
records until Denning and Neumann (1985) proposed requirements and a model for the
real-time Intrusion Detection Expert System with the goal of being able to detect most
intrusions while making it extremely difficult to avoid detection. In a follow-on seminal
paper, Denning (1987) went on to further the research into this field.
IDSs are characterized as either focused on misuse detection, based on known
attack patterns or signatures, or anomaly detection, based on deviations in behavior from
normal. Misuse detection has been preferred in commercial environments due to a higher
level of accuracy since it is grounded in known attacks. Academic research has favored
anomaly detection based on its higher potential to recognize novel attacks (Tavallaee,
Stakhanova, & Ghorbani, 2010; Mitchell & Chen, 2014).
Substantial research has been done in anomaly detection across many domains
including intrusion detection. Azad and Jha (2013), in a survey covering 75 research
papers, list over a dozen different data mining techniques that have been applied to
intrusion detection.
Other recent research using a variation of neural networks known as Extreme
Learning Machine (ELM), first introduced by Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2004), has been
applied to intrusion detection with promising results for reducing false positives while
providing good generalized performance with extremely fast learning speeds (Creech &
Jiankun, 2014; Fossaceca, Mazzuchi, & Sarkani, 2015). Baum and Petrie (1966)
originated Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), a type of Markov chain, which model
sequences of potential events. HMMs have been applied to several domains including
speech and handwriting recognition and more recently to modeling cyber-attacks.
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Endsley (1988) first introduced the concept of situation awareness in the context
of human factors research. She defined situation awareness as consisting of perception of
elements in time and space, comprehension of their meaning, and their projection into the
future. Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin (2011) subsequently took a military-inspired
approach to cyber situation awareness, using a “kill chain,” citing the need to better
detect indications of multistage attacks including Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs).

Problem Statement
Existing anomaly detection techniques for IDSs have a high False Positive Rate
(FPR) (Zuech, Khoshgoftaar, & Wald, 2015; Fernandes, Rodrigues, Carvalho, AlMuhtadi, & Proença, 2019). Anomaly based methods, which show promise of detecting
indications of novel cyber-attacks, still typically generate more false positives than
signature-based methods which tend to have more false negatives (Pao, Lee, & Huang,
2015). While substantial research has been conducted on IDSs in general, detection
uncertainty still exists (Inayat et al., 2016). Contributing to this uncertainty is the growth
in network sizes and the increasing complexity and variability of attacks. This, in turn,
has significantly complicated the ability of IDSs to produce accurate alerts (Spathoulas &
Katsikas, 2013a).
Axelsson (2000) in his widely cited paper on the base rate fallacy called false
alerts the biggest issue in IDS effectiveness. Based on Bayesian statistics, he argues that
the false alarm rate should be measured in relation to how many intrusions one would
expect to detect rather than the maximum number of possible false alarms. And that an
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IDS, to be considered effective, would need to have a very high standard of 1/100,000
false alarms per event.
Horne (2015), stressing the continued relevance of Axelsson’s research, illustrates
the base rate fallacy by noting that due to Bayes’ rule that if an IDS has a 99.9% accuracy
rate on a network where 1 in 100,000 inputs, the base rate, comes from a malicious
source, that means that for every 1 true positive alert, the system will generate 99 false
alerts (its positive predictive value).
Perdisci, Ariu, Fogla, Giacinto, and Lee (2009) conclude that the FPRs for IDSs
must be very low. Sommer and Paxson (2010), examining the imbalance between
research into IDSs based on anomaly detection and their operational deployments, concur
that reducing false positives in anomaly detection for IDS must be a top priority given
that IDS error rates have a very high operational cost, as compared to other domains,
which impedes the adoption of anomaly detection.

Goals
The primary goal of this research was to develop a new approach for an anomalybased IDS that can better minimize false positives with the ability to detect indications of
contemporary cyber-attacks while not sacrificing accuracy. This goal has been
demonstrated using a recent and relevant set of comprehensive benchmark data, a
secondary goal, containing both cyber-attack and normal traffic.
However, while virtually all agree that FPRs for IDSs must be low, there is not a
widely used benchmark rate for FPR cited in recent IDS research. Additionally, some
researchers use terms such as false alerts and false alarms interchangeably with false
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positives but others have different definitions which can create confusion and invalid
comparisons.
While Axelsson (2000) put forth a high standard for false alarms and
effectiveness, McHugh (2000), in his critique of the evaluation of IDS systems conducted
by Lincoln Labs for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1998
and 1999, cited that DARPA had a criterion of 0.1% for false alarm rate. However, many
researchers since then tend to compare their results among different algorithms and with
other studies using the same data sets versus setting an absolute target for FPR. Though,
more recently, Swarnkar and Hubballi (2016) cited 0.6% as an acceptable FPR for their
anomaly-based detection method for Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) cyber-attacks
using a data set of more than one million events.
The primary evaluation measurement for this research was to demonstrate that the
proposed two-stage approach produced a reduction of false positives by at least 10%
compared to just using the first stage. A secondary measurement was to demonstrate an
overall FPR of 0.6% or less. Both evaluation goals were achieved. In addition to
showing improved performance using two stages, the results were also compared to other
algorithms using the same training and testing data sets and to published research.

Relevance and Significance
Despite substantial academic and commercial research and increased spending on
computer and network security, major computer data breaches involving sensitive
personal identity, financial, medical, trade secrets, or national security data continue to
occur. According to Ponemon and Trunkey (2016), the average cost of a data breach had
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increased by 29% over the prior two years to $4 Million. Verizon (2016) reported that
out of 2,260 confirmed breaches analyzed from 2015 that attackers take minutes or less to
compromise a system but 80% of the victims did not realize they had been breached for
weeks or longer.
Furthermore, Cyber-Physical Systems, which fuse network and computer
components with physical components such as actuators and sensors, have become more
commonplace. With the related emergence of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), large
numbers of previously un-networked devices, including mundane consumer devices such
as voice-activated speakers, thermostats, televisions, and even refrigerators, are being
placed on the Internet and can pose a threat. An example is where a refrigerator was used
to send spam email with hypertext links that could install malware if the links were
clicked (Starr, 2014).
Another IoT related incident occurred in 2016 when the Mirai botnet slowed or
stopped major portions of the Internet in the eastern United States. It accomplished that
by merely taking advantage of poor security controls in low-cost IoT devices, such as
surveillance cameras and wireless routers, that were connected to the Internet via highspeed broadband connections. Mirai, a self-replicating worm, doubled in size every 76
minutes and at its peak controlled around 600,000 devices around the world. It was used
to launch a then record setting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack using the
bandwidth harnessed (Graff, 2017).
Other trends such as cloud computing, where computing resources are being
increasingly distributed, virtualized, and outsourced, and similar large-scale disruptive
networking technology shifts including Network Function Virtualization and Software
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Defined Networks, create new cyber-attack surfaces and challenges (Modi, et al., 2013;
Alsmadi & Xu, 2015). Cyber-Physical Systems include controls for critical systems such
as smart electrical grids hosting nuclear and other power generation plants, oil and gas
pipelines, unmanned aircraft and drones, self-driving automobiles, chemical and other
industrial plants, and healthcare devices. While many confirmed data breaches often
result in many millions of dollars in economic losses, such as those related to credit card
and financial account fraud, Cyber-Physical Systems raise the stakes with potential largescale catastrophic consequences to life. Thus, it is increasingly important to secure them
from intrusions, both known and novel (Mitchell & Chen, 2014).
Given the increased stakes, the need for faster and more automated responses to
indications of potential cyber-attacks is critical. Many commercial IDSs and related
systems are capable of blocking traffic in real-time, by source Internet Protocol (IP)
address for example, based on intrusion alerts. Such an automated response is
categorized as an active response vs. a passive one. However, an action based on a false
positive with an automated response could deny resource access to legitimate users or
tasks that could be unacceptable based on the circumstance. An example of such would
be preventing access to an Electronic Medical Records system by an emergency room
doctor. Or more apocalyptically, the scenario from the 1983 movie War Games, where a
computer program attempts to automatically launch nuclear missiles, based on the
mistaken conclusion that the country is under attack, after humans are taken out of the
decision loop. Thus, many organizations prefer a passive response that requires
personnel to investigate each alert. But such an approach could lead to delays resulting in
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a data breach or other undesired consequences (Marchetti, Pierazzi, Colajanni, & Guido,
2016).
Many researchers agree that the key to detecting novel threats is through
anomaly-based detection (Tavallaee et al., 2010; Mitchell & Chen, 2014). IDSs are a
mainstay of any defense-in-depth security strategy (Zuech et al., 2015) but many
commercial security infrastructure deployments are still predominately based on known
threat signatures (Bhatt, Manadhata, & Zomlot, 2014). Intrusions evolve continuously
and signature-based detection alone will often fail when presented with indications of
intrusions that are not part of a known signature base (Wu & Banzhaf, 2010).
However, despite a large body of research on anomaly-based IDSs and the great
promise they have shown, operational deployments have been impeded since error rates
have very high operational costs (Wang & Lee, 2001; Sommer & Paxson, 2010). And,
validating false positives can also distract human operators from real attacks (Ho, Lai,
Chen, Wang, & Tai, 2012).
To put the significance of false positive percentages in the context of a real-world
operational network, S. Bhatt et al. (2014) estimated that Hewlett Packard’s corporate
network, which then spanned 166 countries with more than 300,000 employees,
generated between 100 billion to 1 trillion security events daily of which approximately 3
billion were processed by the security infrastructure. The infrastructure included IDSs
feeding into a Security Information and Event Management system along with audit logs
from other network devices. Thus, even a small percentage of false positives can
translate into a large number of events to review. IBM estimated that organizations
spend $1.3 million a year dealing with false positives, wasting 21,000 hours on average,
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and proposed more research on advancing Artificial Intelligence as a solution (Barlow,
2017).
According to research from the Information System Security Certification
Consortium (2018), a non-profit organization which specializes in training and
certifications for cybersecurity professionals, the shortage of cybersecurity professionals
is close to three million people globally. They also cite that nearly 60% of roughly 1,500
security professionals surveyed say their companies are at a moderate or extreme risk of
cybersecurity attacks due to this shortage. Cisco (2016) had previously estimated that
there would be a shortage of 2 million cybersecurity professionals globally by 2019,
particularly amongst those monitoring and responding to alerts from IDSs and related
systems in Security Operations Centers. Such staffing shortages further justify the need
for more accurate and automated approaches to intrusion detection and response. While
no credible research purports to completely eliminate false positives in IDS anomaly
detection techniques, improvements to further reduce the rate and need for human
intervention are well-justified.

Barriers and Issues
An anticipated issue prior to conducting this research was to identify a publicly
available and suitable data set that reflects real-world conditions with ample benchmarks
for comparison. Newer data sets exist for various purposes, such as cyber competitions,
but given their recent nature there will generally be a lack of ample published research in
the academic literature for comparison. However, more than a dozen research papers
have been published between 2017 and 2019 for the chosen University of New South
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Wales Network Based 2015 (UNSW-NB15) data set (Moustafa & Slay, 2015) which
provided some basis for comparisons as this research evolved.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
An assumption for this research is that the UNSW-NB15 data set is correctly
labeled and reflective of both contemporary attack and normal traffic. Given the goal of
using a contemporary data set, there will have been less academic scrutiny given the
amount of time since the release of that data set as compared to the more traditional, and
dated, ones typically used for intrusion detection research.
Another anticipated limitation of using a newer data set was that false positives
may be much higher than would have been achieved using the same exact approach as on
one of the more traditional intrusion research data sets. Moustafa and Slay (2016)
illustrated this in repeating five experiments using Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree
(DT), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Logistic Regression, and ExpectationMaximization clustering on both the Knowledge Discovery in Databases Cup 1999
(KDD99) (University of California, Irvine, 1999), a classic and widely used intrusion
detection research data set, and the UNSW-NB15 data set. The False Alarm Rate (FAR)
obtained on the UNSW-NB15 data set was higher than when using KDD99 in all five
cases. In the ANN example, KDD99 yielded a FAR of 1.48% while that same
experiment using UNSW-NB15 produced a 21.13% FAR.
Separately, Khammassi and Krichen (2017) explored feature selection algorithms
and applied the same proposed method to both KDD99 and UNSW-NB15. For KDD99,
they used a subset of 18 features with a 0.105% FAR while the same algorithm for
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UNSW-NB15, with a subset of 20 features, provided a FAR of 6.390%. They concluded
that the difference in FAR was due to UNSW-NB15 being more complex than KDD99.
This limitation was mitigated by setting goals as a marked improvement
compared to other experiments using the same data set as opposed to using benchmarks
from experiments performed with outdated data sets. As for delimitations, the scope of
this research focused on network-based intrusion detection as opposed to host-based.

Definition of Terms
Definitions without citations are the local definitions of this research only.

Analysis:

attack methods which breach Internet-based applications
such as via ports (e.g., port scans), emails (e.g., spam), or
web scripts (Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

Attack Traffic:

network packets containing an attempt to compromise the
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a computer
network or host such as through the manipulation of
network packets, protocols, or payloads

Backdoor:

an attack technique to bypass normal authentication to
secure unauthorized resource access (Moustafa, Turnbull,
& Choo, 2018)

Classifier:

a model designed to predict which target class, or category,
a data element belongs, such as attack or normal traffic
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Denial of Service (DoS):

an attempt to make host or network resources, such as
memory, processing, and bandwidth, unavailable to
authorized users by overwhelming those resources
(Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

IDS:

a collection of hardware and software resources that can
detect, analyze, and report indications of intrusions in
computer systems and networks (Inayat et al., 2016)

ELM:

a type of classifier derived from neural network models
which does not require its hidden layer to be tuned (Huang,
Zhu, & Siew, 2004)

Exploit:

a sequence of instructions that takes advantage of a
vulnerability causing unintentional behavior on a host or
network (Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

Fuzzer:

a program designed to discover weak points in an
application, an operating system, or a network by feeding it
with massive inputting of random data (Moustafa,
Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

Generic:

a technique that works against a block-cipher to cause a
collision without respect to the configuration of the blockcipher (Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

HMM:

a type of Markov Chain that can be used to model and
classify series of events (Baum & Petrie, 1966)

Normal Traffic:

computer network packets which are not malicious in intent
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False Positive (FP):

the incorrect classification of a data element as belonging
to a given class, such as attack traffic for the purposes of
this research, when it actually belongs to another class,
such as normal traffic

Reconnaissance:

attacks that are designed to gather information about a
network or hosts to evade security controls; also called
probing (Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

Shellcode:

a small piece of code, often written in machine language,
that is used as a payload to exploit a software vulnerability
(Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

Situation awareness:

perception of elements in time and space, comprehension
of their meaning, and their projection into the future
(Endsley, 1988)

Worm:

a malware program that replicates itself in order to spread
to other hosts via a network by exploiting a vulnerability
(Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo, 2018)

List of Acronyms
ANN:

Artificial Neural Network

APT:

Advanced Persistent Threat

C2:

Command and Control

CFS:

Correlation Feature Selection

CSV:

Comma Separated Values
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DARPA:

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DDoS:

Distributed Denial of Service

DoS:

Denial of Service

DNS:

Domain Name System

DT:

Decision Tree

DR:

Detection Rate

ELM:

Extreme Learning Machine

FAR:

False Alarm Rate

FN:

False Negative

FNR:

False-Negative Rate

FP:

False Positive

FPR:

False-Positive Rate

HIDS:

Host-based Intrusion Detection System

HMM:

Hidden Markov Model

HTTP:

Hypertext Transport Protocol

IDS:

Intrusion Detection System

IoT:

Internet of Things

IP:

Internet Protocol

KDD99:

Knowledge Discovery in Databases Cup 1999

KNN:

K-Nearest Neighbor

MATLAB:

Matrix Laboratory

ML:

Machine Learning

MLP:

Multi-Layer Perceptron
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NB:

Naïve Bayes

NIDS:

Network-based Intrusion Detection System

OS:

Operating System

PCA:

Principal Component Analysis

SVM:

Support Vector Machine

TCP:

Transmission Control Protocol

TN:

True Negative

TP:

True Positive

TPR:

True-Positive Rate

UNSW-NB15:

University of New South Wales - Network Based 2015

Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the problem of high rates of false positives
and how they are impeding the adoption of anomaly detection techniques that are needed
to better detect indications of compromise for today’s continuously evolving cyberattacks. Several examples are given of the changing cyber landscape to illustrate that the
relevance and significance of this research reaches far beyond merely preventing
financial losses. Life and liberty are now more at risk than ever before. The primary
goal of this research, which was achieved, was to create a new technique to minimize
false positives using promising emerging research into ELM as a classifier, in
conjunction with HMM, in a situation awareness framework. The anticipated primary
challenge, which was overcome, was finding a data set for training and testing that is
indicative of both modern normal and attack traffic patterns, along with a basis for
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comparison, versus using one of the more commonly used, and dated, IDS research data
sets prevalent in the literature.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Overview
To appreciate and comprehend the problem of reducing false positives in
intrusion detection, it is necessary to cover several relevant areas of the literature starting
with IDSs. The history of IDSs, going back to Anderson (1980), and earlier, was briefly
covered in the introduction. This section will focus on their evolution post-Denning
(1987) along with the different types of IDSs that have been researched and deployed.
The review will then focus on how IDSs are evaluated including by measuring FPs and
other metrics. Popular data sets for training and testing that have been used for research
in the literature and the associated data set challenges will also be covered. This will be
followed by a review of the literature of the various techniques that have been used in
machine learning with a focus on the reduction of FPs along with the importance of
feature selection. The review will then cover situation awareness. Different types of
cyber-attacks, often as illustrated by the UNSW-NB15 data set chosen for training and
testing, will also be discussed throughout the section.

Types of IDS
Many of the most widely deployed IDSs, such as Snort (Roesch,1999) and Bro
(Paxson, 1999), are signature-based. These are often also referred to as misuse-based,
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rules-based, knowledge-based, ontology-based, or expert systems. With this type of
IDS, events are compared to predefined rules or patterns that are generalized knowledge
of attacks. Each event observed is matched against fields such as source and destination
IP addresses, ports, transport headers, and payload. In the Snort example, each rule often
has documentation about the potential for false positives and negatives and often the
corrective action that should be taken. Snort users can contribute rules and there are over
20,000 that were developed between 1999 and 2014 (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita,
2014). However, signature rule writing is highly dependent on the expertise of the writer.
There is latency between the time a new vulnerability or type of cyber-attack is
discovered and the time a new rule is written and implemented which renders signaturebased systems vulnerable to novel attacks.
According to Inayat et al. (2016), at least 25 other IDSs of note, in addition to
Snort and Bro, had been proposed between 1996 and 2015. Five were characterized as
signature-based, four as anomaly-based, eight as both anomaly and signature-based
(hybrid), and the rest as other.
In addition to classifying IDSs as based on their detection approach by either
signatures or anomalies, IDSs are further classified as either Host-based IDS (HIDS) or
Network-based IDS (NIDS), respectively, depending on the whether they analyze system
logs generated by a host Operating System (OS) or network traffic data based on
communications to and from hosts (Tavallaee et al., 2010; Zuech et al., 2015). Hosts are
sometimes referred to as end-points. An end-point could be a personal computer, server,
mobile phone, Internet connected automobile, printer, voice-activated speaker, or other
networked device.
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NIDS can be based on either packet inspection or flow detection (Luh,
Marschalek, Kaiser, Janicke, & Schrittwieser, 2016). Packet detectors analyze
communication packet payloads. Deep Packet Inspection requires significant computing
resources so packet detectors often only analyze a subset of the packet such as HTTP
headers for the case of web traffic. Encryption, in some cases, can thwart the analysis of
certain payload data beyond the packet headers needed for routing or switching. Some
flow-based detection systems analyze communications patterns using attributes such as
source and destination IP addresses, port numbers, state flags, and the number of packets
and amount of data transmitted. Many routers and switches can export flow data using
common formats such as NetFlow.
NIDS generally free up resources by not having processing on each host, may be
able to detect issues that could be obfuscated by log tampering on a compromised host,
and are more OS independent. But they are considered more difficult to configure to
have full coverage within a network. HIDS, on the other hand, benefit by distributing
resources across hosts and use OS-specific rules that might improve detection
performance (Mitchell & Chen, 2014). Often, HIDS and NIDS are both used on the same
network being monitored to provide better defense-in-depth.

IDS Performance Measurements
IDS performance for a binary classifier is typically defined using measurements
based on four variables, which make up a confusion matrix, comparing the classifier’s
predicted output with known labeled actual values (Fawcett, 2006; Mitchell & Chen,
2014). A True Positive (TP) occurs when the predicted output is positive, an indication
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of an attack for this research, and the actual instance is positive. A True Negative (TN)
occurs when the predicted output is negative, normal traffic for this research, and the
actual instance is negative. An FP occurs when the predicted output is positive, an attack
for this research, but the actual instance is negative, or normal traffic. A False Negative
(FN) occurs when the predicted output is negative, or normal for this research, but the
actual instance is positive. Various measurements can be calculated from these four
variables, including:

Accuracy =

TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN

(1)

False Positive Rate (FPR) =

FP
FP + TN

(2)

False Negative Rate (FNR) =

FN
FN + TP

(3)

True Positive Rate (TPR) or Detection Rate (DR) =

False Alarm Rate (FAR) =

FPR + FNR
2

TP
TP + FN

(4)

(5)

For the purposes of this research, the Moustafa and Slay (2015) definition of False
Alarm Rate (FAR) is used unless otherwise noted. Other researchers often use FAR as
interchangeable with FPR. Thus, it is important to verify the formulas used in different
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research papers, that may have the same or similar name or acronym, before comparing
results.
There is often a trade-off between desirable characteristics such as TPR with
undesirable ones such as FPR. A Receiver Operating Characteristic graph (Fawcett,
2006; Bhuyan et al., 2014) can be used to depict how well a given algorithm is
performing. The TPR is graphed on the Y-axis and the FPR on the X-axis. Different
IDS algorithms can be compared on the same graph to show their respective lift from
average detection based on a known test data set. Other related measures, including Area
Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve, have been proposed as a measure of
classifier robustness. Another proposed measure is the geographic mean, G-Mean, which
is the square root of the positive class accuracy times the negative class accuracy (Zong,
Huang, & Chen, 2013).

Data Sets for Training and Testing
A significant and recurring issue for research in anomaly detection for IDSs is the
availability of data sets for training and testing that reflect current real-world conditions
and continuously evolving intrusion threats (Brown, Cowperthwaite, Hijazi, & Somayaji,
2009; Shiravi, Shiravi, Tavallaee, & Ghorbani, 2012). Some of the earliest IDS datasets
commonly used for research are those produced for IDS evaluations for DARPA by
Lincoln Labs in 1998 (Lippmann et al., 2000) and 1999 (Lippmann, Haines, Fried,
Korba, & Das, 2000). Many more recent studies in IDS use the KDD99 data set
(University of California, Irvine, 1999) which was derived from data originally created
for the DARPA evaluations (Tavallaee et al., 2010). Weller-Fahy, Borghetti, and
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Sodemann (2015), argue that the KDD99 intrusion data set remains the only
comprehensive and fully labeled benchmark data set that is widely used by researchers.
Hu, Gao, Wang, Wu, and Maybank (2014) also suggest that the KDD99 is still the most
credible data set for benchmarking IDS results.
However, KDD99 has also been criticized by many, including Tavallaee, Bagheri,
Lu, and Ghorbani (2009), as a poor evaluator of anomaly detection techniques. The
earlier DARPA evaluations, upon which KDD99 was based, were also criticized by
McHugh (2000) for several issues associated with their design and execution. A refined
version of KDD99, Network Security Lab-KDD, or NSL-KDD, which removes some of
the duplicate records from both the training and testing data sets, was created to address
some of the original criticisms of KDD99. Other researchers point out that the
cybersecurity landscape has changed significantly since the creation of the KDD99 data
and that many don’t consider experiments that use older data sets as relevant today
(Sommer & Paxson, 2010).
To address this, Song et al. (2011) developed their own data set since they could
not find what they considered a viable alternative to the KDD99 data set. They used data
collected from a diverse network of honeypots over three years to create a new data set
called Kyoto 2006+. It includes 93 million sessions with 50 million being normal and the
rest being attack. And, it was based on 14 features derived from KDD99 plus 10
additional features such as anonymized IP source address.
Other research has used commercial data sets from large security service
providers. For example, Sundaramurthy, Bhatt, and Eisenbarth (2012), whom were
affiliated with Hewlett Packard, analyzed Intrusion Prevention System data from Hewlett
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Packard’s Tipping Point platform which had included over 35 billion alerts collected over
a five-year period from devices located in over 1,000 customer networks worldwide.
However, Zuech et al. (2015) point out that organizations can be reluctant or legally
constrained from sharing such data. The results published from the above data sets were
aggregate statistics and presumably the authors would not be able to share the underlying
data sets from their employer even if anonymized. A study by Coull, Wright, Monrose,
Collins, and Reiter (2007) discusses how similar network trace data can be deanonymized which provides a further disincentive for sharing potentially sensitive data.
Dainotti, Pescape, and Claffy (2012), while researching related Internet traffic
classification problems, cite a lack of sharable network packet traces which they believe
is partially due to privacy concerns. Spathoulas and Katsikas (2013b) concur that such a
lack of data sets to test intrusion detection methods are a problem. They also believe that
the problem is further compounded when researchers create new data sets for studies but
do not make them available to others.
Yet, despite the criticism of KDD99 in particular, Azad and Jha (2013) analyzed
75 research papers in intrusion detection from 2000 through 2012 and found that 42%
used the KDD99 data set. Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) cite data sets as an issue
in truly understanding the impact of false positive reduction research. Milenkoski,
Vieira, Kounev, Avritzer, and Payne (2015) also list errors as an issue in publicly
available data traces along with their limited shelf-life due to new attacks. In addition to
DARPA and KDD99, other data sets are available from the Cooperative Association for
Internet Data Analysis, capture the flag and cyber defense competitions such as DefCon,
the Internet Traffic Archive, the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab/International Computer
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Science Institute, MAWILab, and the Internet Storm Center (Milenkoski et al., 2015;
Zuech et al., 2015).
More recently, Moustafa and Slay (2015), also concluded that there was a lack of
a suitable comprehensive data set for evaluation of NIDS research efforts since data sets
such as KDD99 do not reflect modern network traffic. In response, they created a new
data set called UNSW-NB15. It consists of a hybrid of modern real normal activities and
synthesized attack behaviors. The attack traffic was created using the Ixia PerfectStorm
tool in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security.
They have made UNSW-NB15 freely available to researchers for academic
purposes. It contains nine categories of attack traffic (fuzzers, analysis, backdoor, DoS,
exploit, generic, reconnaissance, shellcode, & worm) and 49 features. The 49 features
are further divided as: flow, basic, content, time, connection, additional generated, and
labeled features. Two of the 49 features are labels: one for normal or attack traffic and a
second one for the attack traffic type. A full list of these features in included in Appendix
A.
Moustafa and Slay (2016) provided a separate justification of the complexity of
the data set. Moustafa (2017) also gave details of how the derived features were
constructed. A ground truth table giving additional information on each attack including
the category and corresponding Common Vulnerability and Exposures data crossreference identifier and description is also available.
Khammassi and Krichen (2017) state that the NIDS research community
considers UNSW-NB15 a new benchmark data set to be used for evaluations of IDSs.
They explored feature selection algorithms and applied the same proposed method to
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both KDD99 and UNSW-NB15. They concluded that UNSW-NB15 is more complex
than KDD99 and that further research was needed to improve classification for this new
benchmark data set.

IDS and Machine Learning Techniques
IDS research that is based on anomaly detection often uses Machine Learning
(ML) techniques. Russell and Norvig (2003) define ML as part of the field of Artificial
Intelligence and as the ability to adapt to new circumstances to detect and extrapolate
patterns. Two of the main approaches to ML are supervised and unsupervised learning.
In supervised learning, labeled training data is used to infer a function to predict future
values. In unsupervised learning, the data instances are not labeled. Unsupervised
techniques have more potential applicability, given a lack of sufficiently labeled data, but
assume that normal instances are more prevalent in the test data than abnormal instances.
If that is not true, then those algorithms tend to have higher false positive rates (Bhuyan
et al., 2014). In addition to supervised and unsupervised learning, there is semisupervised learning where labeled training instances are only available for the normal
class. Two primary types of supervised and unsupervised learning are classification and
clustering respectively. Numerous ML algorithms have been applied in IDS research
including: ANN, Bayesian statistics such as NB, Gaussian Regression, Support Vector
Machine (SVM), HMM, DTs, and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN).
Each method has its strengths and weaknesses. For many of the IDS methods
above, algorithms are needed at some stage to optimize – either minimize or maximize –
an objective function (Rai & Tyagi, 2013).
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Biologically Inspired Models
Biologically inspired models, in addition to ANN, include the Genetic Algorithm,
Particle Swarm Optimization, Ant Colony Optimization, and Artificial Immune Systems
(Tsai, Hsu, Lin, & Lin, 2009; Bhuyan et al., 2014). Benmessahel, Xie, Chellal, and
Semong (2019) created an IDS based on Locust Swarm Optimization in conjunction with
a Feed-forward Neural Network and achieved a lower FPR than the same approach using
Particle Swarm Optimization & Genetic Algorithm. Igbe (2019) proposed an IDS using
an ensemble of Artificial Immune System techniques including Negative Selection
Algorithm and Dendritic Cell Algorithm that achieved an FPR of 1.34% with a 98.11%
accuracy using a subset of UNSW-NB15 consisting of DoS & normal traffic.

Clustering
Clustering is an unsupervised method that seeks to categorize items, such as
alerts, based on similarity (Weller-Fahy et al., 2015). An example of clustering is kmeans clustering where the data (observations) are split into k categories, or clusters.
Each cluster is identified by its center. The algorithm is highly dependent on the initial
states and can converge quickly to a local versus global optimum, which can lead to
erroneous results (Liu & Yu, 2005). To overcome the local optima problem, researchers
have proposed several techniques such as biologically inspired methods including ANN,
evolutionary algorithms, and swarm intelligence such as Ant Colony and Particle Swarm
Optimization (Rai & Tyagi, 2013).
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Similarity and Distance Measures
Weller-Fahy et al. (2015) cite the importance of similarity and distance measures
in network intrusion anomaly detection. They specifically call out measures used during
feature selection, classification, and clustering. They broadly define measures as power
based, such as Euclidean, Manhattan, and Mahalanobis or distribution based, including
Kullback-Leibler distance and entropy.
Entropy is a measure of randomness and has been applied to detecting activities
such as port scanning, DoS, and worms. Bereziński, Jasiul, and Szpyrka (2015) used
entropy as a method of detecting behaviors related to botnets such as Command and
Control (C2). They found that Tsallis and Renyi entropy performed better than Shannon
entropy as measured using FPR and accuracy.

Decision Trees
DTs are implemented using “if then else” rules. To classify a data sample, they
start with a root node and end with a leaf node. The attributes used to create the tree are
important. Sindhu, Geetha, and Kannan (2012) evaluated several types of DTs including
Decision Stump, C4.5, NB Tree, Random Forest, Random Tree, and Representative Tree
for use as a light-weight IDS. They identified that a suitable subset of features and
removing redundant instances are important to avoid bias in the learning algorithm and
are key factors for achieving better detection accuracy. Shah, Khiyal, and Awan (2015)
categorize DTs as simple but very powerful.
Valero León (2017) used the test and training set referenced in Moustafa and Slay
(2016) to create his models but used the full UNSW-NB15 data set for testing. He
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provided confusion matrices for two models. One model was based on a DT and the
other one, for contrast, used Snort (Roesch, 1999), a signature-based system that was
loaded with the latest rules that were available at the time of the experiment. The DTbased model outperformed Snort by a significant margin.

Boosting
Boosting is a technique that improves a weak classifier, or learner, to achieve a
higher accuracy. Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) is the most commonly used form and
was introduced by Freund and Schapire (1997). Another form is LogitBoost, introduced
by Friedman, Hastie, and Tibshirani (2000) to better address the issue of noise and
outliers than AdaBoost. AdaBoost uses an exponential loss function while LogitBoost
uses a linear loss function hence making LogitBoost less sensitive to noise and outliers.
Kamarudin, Maple, Watson, and Safa (2017) created a LogitBoost based IDS in
conjunction with a Random Forest DT. As a motivation, they cited achieving low false
alarm rates with high attack recognition for novel attacks as a major challenge. They
were able to achieve a slightly better performance in terms of DR and accuracy using
LogitBoost as compared to AdaBoost. They concluded that their algorithm provided a
comparable detection accuracy rate with a low false alarm rate. They called a low false
alarm rate, which they defined the same as FPR, as the most crucial property of IDSs.
Tama and Rhee (2019) created an IDS using Gradient Boosted Machine, also
known as a Gradient Boosted Regression Tree. Gradient Boosted Machine was created
to improve the performance of Classification and Regression Tree. Using UNSW-NB15
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data, they demonstrated that their approach achieved a lower FPR and a higher accuracy
rate than compared to another type of DT.

Mixture Models
Mixture models are a type of unsupervised learning technique used to identify
subpopulations. Moustafa, Slay, and Creech (2017) created a method they called
Geometric Area Analysis based on Trapezoidal Area Estimation computed from the
parameters of a Beta Mixture Model. They used Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
for reducing the high dimensionality of the data. Citing the inability of conventional
IDSs to detect new intrusive events due to a high FPR, they demonstrated that their
method provided a lower FPR than several other techniques using the NSL-KDD and
UNSW-NB15 data sets.
Moustafa, Creech, and Slay (2017) proposed an Anomaly Detection System based
on Finite Dirichlet Mixture Model with a PCA-based feature reduction. Their approach
yielded a lower FPR than other comparable approaches, such as Multivariate Correlation
Analysis and Triangle Area Nearest Neighbor, using the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15
data sets. The other approaches that they used for comparison were based on correlation
and distance measures which usually cannot detect modern attacks that mimic normal
traffic. However, they imply that their approach can detect such attacks due to the
precise boundaries that can detect small differences between normal traffic and attack
vectors.
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, and Hu (2018) put forth a new scheme based on a Beta
Mixture Model and HMM which they call Beta Mixture HMM. Using UNSW-NB15
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data, they demonstrated that their scheme outperforms Classification and Regression
Tree, KNN, SVM, Random Forest, and Outlier Gaussian Mixture in terms of FPR, DR,
and Accuracy.

Bayesian Approaches
Bayesian networks are a common classifier based on a directed acyclic graph with
nodes representing attributes and arcs representing dependencies. A simplified form is
the NB classifier where all of the attributes are assumed to be independent. Barbara,
Couto, Jajodia, Popyack, and Wu (2001) used NB for their Audit Data Analysis and
Mining platform for classifying cyber-attacks and non-attacks without prior knowledge of
new cyber-attacks. Koc, Mazzuchi, and Sarkani (2012) cite several prior uses of
Bayesian statistics for IDS and present a Hidden NB model that relaxes the NB
conditionally independence assumption for better accuracy than traditional NB models.

Genetic Algorithm
A genetic algorithm is based on Darwin’s evolutionary principle of survival of the
fittest and seeks to optimize a population of candidate solutions based on a fitness
function. Genetic algorithms simulate natural reproduction using cross over and other
techniques similar to gene selection, mutation, and recombination. Crosbie and Spafford
(1995) were one of the first to propose using a genetic algorithm for intrusion detection.
Hoque, Mukit, and Bikas (2012) and others subsequently used genetic algorithms for IDS
research but the results in relation to false positives were not promising compared to
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other cited research. A drawback of the genetic algorithm is the amount of time and
computing resources it takes to reach an optimal solution.

Neural Networks
The concept of an ANN, inspired by the function of the human brain, particularly
the interconnection between neurons, has been around since McCulloch and Pitts (1943)
devised a mathematical model for a neuron. ANNs typically consist of layers of nodes,
which contain activation functions, connected by weighted directed links. ANNs use
supervised learning. Labeled data are used to train the ANNs to learn classification
patterns such as intrusion or no intrusion in the case of a binary classifier. Data are
presented to an input layer that often links with one or more hidden layers that then link
to an output layer that provides a result.
Cannady (1998) presented an ANN for misuse detection with network traffic and
concluded that the advantages of that approach included the ability to learn. He listed
disadvantages as the difficulty of obtaining sufficiently large amounts of training data and
the black box nature of neural networks. In addition to the ability to learn, Russell and
Norvig (2003) cite another advantage of ANNs is being able to tolerate noisy inputs.
Wang, Hao, Ma, and Huang (2010) argued that ANNs can improve the
performance of IDSs when compared with other methods but that enhancement is
required. They proposed an approach based on ANN and fuzzy clustering to achieve a
higher detection rate, lower false positive rate, and better stability.
There has been much research into ANNs around optimal network structures,
optimization of weights, training methods such as Back Propagation, and methods to
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avoid overfitting and other challenges. There are several different network structures but
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) is the one that is most used in IDS research (Shah et al.,
2015).

Self-Organizing Map
Self-Organizing Map, as described by Kohonen and Somervuo (1998), is a type of
neural network that can map highly dimensional data into a two-dimensional array.
Rhodes, Mahaffey, and Cannady (2000) cite that the first use of a Self-Organizing Map in
misuse detection was described by Cannady in 1998 which involved the output of a
Kohonen map as input to a feed-forward ANN to detect temporally dispersed attacks
(over a period of time by one attacker) and possibly collaborative attacks (multiple
attackers). Self-Organizing Map does not need to learn intrusive behavior but rather it
learns it through characterizing normal activities. Shah et al. (2015), concur that SelfOrganizing Map provides a simple and efficient method to self-categorize inputs for
clustering that offers a higher speed compared with other learning methods.

Kernel Machines
SVM, sometime referred to more generally as kernel machines, research was
begun by Boser, Guyon, and Vapnik (1992). SVM requires labeled training data and
operates as a classifier by creating a hyper-plane to group data into normal or abnormal
classes.
Perdisci et al. (2009), citing SVMs tendency to have low FPRs, created an IDS
using a multiple SVM voting scheme to detect malicious payloads including polymorphic
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shell code. Li et al. (2012) cited good accuracy results when using SVM for IDS with
clustering and Ant Colony Optimization.
Advantages of SVMs include low FPRs and the ability to work with data that are
not linearly separable by other techniques. However, they tend to be complex to
implement due to the required mapping of the feature space into a higher dimension
which often requires optimization techniques that lead to long training times (Gilmore &
Haydaman, 2016).
Bamakan, Wang, and Shi (2017) created an IDS using a variant of SVM called
Ramp Loss K-Support Vector Classification-Regression which is a multi-class SVM
approach that is well-adapted for skewed and imbalanced data sets, such as attack data
sets used in IDSs. To combat the presence of noise in training data, they introduced a
ramp loss function instead of the hinge loss function usually used in SVMs. The ramp
function helps to depresses outliers. They compared their method to regular K-Support
Vector Classification-Regression and demonstrated, using UNSW-NB15 data, that their
algorithm substantially improved accuracy and reduced FPR.

ELM
ELM, introduced by Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2004) is an emerging technology for
ML. ELM was originally developed from single-hidden-layer feed forward ANNs. ELM
overcomes issues including slow learning speed and poor scalability faced with other
techniques, such as ANN and SVM. The crux of ELM is that the hidden layer need not
be tuned (Huang, Wang, & Lan, 2011). The input biases and weights that connect the
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inputs to the hidden layer are chosen randomly while the output weights are calculated
using a Moore-Penrose inverse which results in faster training times.
Numerous variations of ELMs have been proposed. Ding, Xu, and Nie (2014)
outlined the evolution of ELM and discussed eleven different variations that had been
proposed to improve its performance. Huang, Zhou, Ding, and Zhang (2012) proposed
the equality constrained-optimization-based ELM, which integrates with the learning
rules of a variant of SVMs, called least squares SVM, to find a global solution for the
weights of the output layer. They purport ELM tends to have much better generalized
performance for multi-class classification problems at up to a thousand times faster
learning speeds than traditional SVM.
For the basic version of ELM, the number of hidden nodes (neurons) needs to be
determined by the user typically by trial-and-error. Ding et al. (2014) stated that
determining the number of hidden neurons to use for different data sets is an open
research problem. However, Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2006) demonstrated that ELM is
very stable across a wide range of hidden nodes but performance can degrade with too
few or too many neurons.
Huang, Chen, and Siew (2006) proposed a solution for this called Incremental
ELM where hidden neurons are added incremental until a given criteria is met. Huang
and Chen (2008) offered an enhanced version of this called Enhanced Incremental
Extreme Learning Machine. And Wang, Xu, Lee, and Lee (2018) proposed an enhanced
version of Equality Constrained-optimization-based Extreme Learning Machine, called
Construction with Adaptive Increments, where the number of hidden neurons are
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determined in an adaptively incremental way and the output weights are derived without
having to be recomputed.
Cheng, Tay, and Huang (2012) applied ELM to the intrusion detection domain
and concluded that the basic ELM model outperforms SVM in training and testing speed
but had slightly lower accuracy using KDD99 data. But, a kernel-based ELM achieved
higher accuracy than an SVM.
Castaño, Fernández-Navarro, and Hervás-Martínez (2013) introduced PCA-ELM.
Their method eliminates the random initialization of the ELM weights and determines
them based on a PCA of the training data. This method transforms the data into a number
of principal components which often better highlights anomalies. They trialed their
method on various non-IDS related data sets and reported positive results.
Zong et al. (2013) introduced a weighted ELM to compensate for complex data
classes, such as in IDSs, where the majority class tends to be favored based on training
data. In many IDS implementations, this class would typically be normal events. They
assigned a weight to each sample to heighten the impact of the minority class while
dampening the majority class. Other techniques were discussed such as over sampling or
under sampling of the testing data but were dismissed. The authors demonstrated their
approach using a variety of non-IDS data sets and were able to influence the balance of
FPR and TPR as shown on a Receiver Operating Characteristic graph. Xia and Hoi
(2013) used Multiple Kernel Boosting with the Multiple Classification Reduced Kernel
ELM (Deng, Zheng, & Zhang, 2013).
Creech and Jiankun (2014) used an ELM approach for a HIDS in conjunction
with a full semantic analysis of system calls. That resulted in higher accuracy and
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reduced false positives compared to other techniques including SVM, HMM, MLP, and
KNN. They highlighted the decision engine training speed with ELM but noted it has
slightly higher processing needs.
According to Fossaceca et al. (2015), ELMs are straightforward to implement,
computationally efficient, and have excellent learning performance characteristics. They
implemented an ELM based IDS solution, dubbed MARK-ELM, that they purport
achieves superior detection rates and much lower false alarm rates than other approaches
to intrusion detection. The authors compare ELM to SVM and note that ELM
significantly outperforms SVM in computational speed while being on par with SVM for
accuracy.
Wang et al. (2018) also applied their ELM-based Construction with Adaptive
Increments solution to different IDS data sets and compared the results to those of MLP
and SVM solutions. They concluded that ELM had faster training times but had mixed
results for other performance measures such as FPR.

Deep Learning Approaches
Another more recent area of research in ML is on deep networks, which are multilayer ANNs. Types of deep networks based on Restricted Boltzmann Machine include
Deep Belief Network and Deep Restricted Boltzmann Machine. Types based on AutoEncoders include Stacked Auto-Encoders and Stacked De-noising Auto-Encoders.
Kasun, Zhou, Huang, and Vong (2013) concluded deep networks outperform traditional
multi-layer ANNs, SLFNs, and SVMs for big data sets but exhibit slow learning speeds.
Yu, Zhuang, He, and Shi (2015) citing the success of deep learning models and ELM,
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created a deep learning ELM named DrELM. They compared both ELM and deep
learning methods including linear ELM, kernel-based ELM using both Gaussian and
Sigmoid kernels, Optimally-Pruned ELM, Deep Restricted Boltzmann Machine, and
Stacked Auto-Encoder. They concluded that their DrELM outperforms linear and kernelbased ELM and is comparable to other deep learning methods using non-IDS related data
sets.
Tchakoucht and Ezziyyani (2018), stated that Recurrent Neural Networks, a type
of ANN, are one of the most widely used deep learning techniques due to their predictive
ability with sequential (temporal) data. They developed an IDS using a Multilayered
Echo-State Machine based on Reservoir Computing which in turn is based on both ML
and computational neuroscience. Reservoir Computing was introduced as a solution for
Recurrent Neural Network training bottlenecks, from accurate but slow training methods
such as Long Short-Term Memory, that can involve exploding gradient, vanishing
gradient, and slow convergence. Recurrent Neural Networks as a reservoir have been
described as Echo-State Networks. Using an Echo-State Network involves randomly
generating an individual Recurrent Neural Network layer (reservoir) and then only
training the reservoir to output connections. Tchakoucht and Ezziyyani (2018) used
multiple layers of reservoirs based on promising results for other applications. They were
able to show improved performance over select other IDS techniques and suggested
additional research to further improve DR and FPR. They provided comparisons to prior
results using three data sets including UNSW-NB15.
Blanco, Cilla, Malagón, Penas, and Moya (2018) proposed another deep learning
technique, Convolutional Neural Networks, for a multi-class IDS in conjunction with a
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genetic algorithm. Convolutional Neural Networks are a type of MLP with a
convolutional step to generate intermediate features to preserve spatial relationships
between inputs before input into an MLP. Convolutional Neural Networks were inspired
by the biology of animal visual cortexes and are typically used for image processing
tasks. They arranged the features of UNSW-NB15 to create a 5x5 pixel image and
optimized the classifier using a genetic algorithm to find a better layout for the input
features. They obtained an accuracy of 98.14% but did not provide an FPR.
Muna, Moustafa, and Sitnikova (2018) proposed an IDS approach using Deep
Auto Encoder with a Deep Feed Forward Neural Network architecture. They tested their
approach against both the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15 data sets and concluded that
their proposed approach provided a lower FPR and higher DR than other techniques used
for evaluation.
Vinayakumar et al. (2019) modeled an IDS using a Deep Neural Network. They
compared results to several other algorithms and with varying numbers of layers. While
the results beat some classifiers in terms of FPR, their four-layer Deep Neural Network
had an FPR of 26.4% compared to NB with 2.5% for normal traffic using the UNSWNB15 data set.

Markov Models
A Markov model attempts to calculate the likelihood of a system in a given state
based on a sequence of observations. An HMM (Baum & Petrie, 1966) is a Markov
model with unobserved (hidden) states. Hu, Yu, Qiu, and Chen (2009) described HMMs
as a double stochastic process with an upper layer Markov process whose states are not
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observable and a lower layer one where outputs are emitted and can be observed. An
HMM requires a five-tuple for input and is written as λ = (A, B, π) in compact notation
where N is the number of states, M is the number of symbols per state, A is the state
transition probability, B is the observation symbol emission probability distribution, and
p is the initial state distribution (Rabiner, 1989; Gilmore & Haydaman, 2016).
Warrender, Forrest, and Pearlmutter (1999), calling HMMs one of the most
powerful data modeling methods in existence, compared an HMM analyzing system calls
as part of a HIDS, with three other methods. They found their HMM gave the best
accuracy on average but at a high computational cost. Other researchers such as Hu et al.
(2009) continued the focus on using system calls with HMM for a HIDS and proposed
improved training methods which reduce training time but at the expense of slightly more
false positives.
Ourston, Matzner, Stump, and Hopkins (2003) used an HMM to model multistage attacks using system calls. Their states consisted of probe, consolidate, exploit, and
compromise. They used a C4.5 DT, an ANN, and an HMM on the same data and
concluded the HMM had the most promise to detect multi-stage attacks. Bhatt, Yano,
and Gustavsson (2014) proposed a framework using the kill chain and concluded that
using an HMM for event correlation for detecting APTs looks promising.
Wright, Monrose, and Masson (2004) used HMMs for determining what network
protocol, such as File Transfer Protocol was being used in a given packet, even if the
payload was encrypted, based solely on packet size and inter-arrival time. They used
network traces provided by George Mason University and DARPA and reported
promising results.
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Liang, Wang, Cai, and He (2008) proposed using an HMM for network security
situation awareness based on using network services as states: Domain Name Service
(DNS), World Wide Web, File Transfer Protocol, Network File System, and Mail. They
used normal, attack, compromised, and hacked as observations. While they described the
training and initial set-up of the proposed model, they did not provide any results to
evaluate or any further information on their proposed data set for training and testing.
Sendi, Dagenais, Jabbarifar, and Couture (2012) used an HMM with other
algorihms to model a specific type of DDoS attack relying on the Sadmind Remote
Administration Tool using the DARPA 2000 data set for training and testing. They used
four states for the HMM: normal, attempt, progress, and compromise. They were able to
perfectly predict this specific attack and reduce false positives. However, while detecting
a very specific attack sequence seems trivial they did highlight the ability of HMMs to
detect multi-stage attacks that might be otherwise missed.
Zhou et al. (2015) used an HMM to develop a classifier to differentiate real
attacks from normal traffic and non-attack related faults in an industrial control system
environment. They used three states: normal, fault, and attack and focused on three
types of attacks: spoofing, tampering, and DoS. They used a proprietary data set and
were able to minimize false positives while providing fast detection. They highlighted
the ability of HMMs to detect indications of attacks from both a spatial and temporal
view and the importance of infusing domain specific knowledge into the model.
Chen, Guan, Huang, and Ou (2016) proposed an HMM using three states:
reconnaissance, attack, and stepping-stone. Using IDS records, they reported success
with their HMM to detect on-going multi-state attacks with a precision rate of 93.2%.
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They believe HMMs can be used to further reduce the number of suspicious alerts
generated by IDSs through classification; however, they pointed out the importance of
considering different attack strategies in each stage in developing classifiers. They did
not specify a data set that could be used by other researchers.
Liang, Chen, Yan, Zheng, and Zhuo (2017) also proposed using HMMs to model
network security situation awareness with a scaled training method using entropy. They
chose four states: good, probed, attacked, and compromised and used the DARPA 2000
traces as a data set. However, in addition to using an older data set, they did not provide
any measures for false positives. Their primary focus was on the training aspect of the
models.
HMMs have been used successfully as classifiers within intrusion detection.
However, many researchers have used HMMs as part of a HIDS with a focus on using
system calls as observations. While NIDS and related network classification research
using HMMs has also been promising, many of the studies use older or unspecified data
sets and often focus on a narrow range of specific attack types such as DDoS. But many
researchers agree that HMMs provide a temporal aspect to classification problems in
addition to spatial which is important in detecting indications of multi-stage attacks.

Hybrid Methods
There are combined learners that include ensemble, fusion-based, and hybrid.
These approaches generally seek to combine several different methods so that the end
result outperforms the individual results. An example of an IDS hybrid that combines
both signature and anomaly-based methods is called EMERALD (Porras & Neumann,

42
1997). This type of approach has been shown to reduce false alarms and increase the
capability of detecting unknown attacks. Mukkamala, Sung, and Abraham (2005),
demonstrated that an ensemble of classifiers performs better than each algorithm
individually but there is often difficulty in scaling such an approach to large data sets.
Depren, Topallar, Anarim, and Ciliz (2005) proposed a hybrid anomaly and
misuse IDS using Self-Organizing Map for modeling normal behavior. The misuse
portion used a J48 DT to classify various cyber-attacks. They concluded that their hybrid
approach performed better than the individual ones.
Karthick, Hattiwale, and Ravindran (2012) used a hybrid approach with network
traffic to identify malware. They used a NB classifier as a first stage followed by an
HMM as a second stage to identify malicious source IP addresses. The NB passed traffic
in real-time while the HMM was off-line. TCP state flags were used for the HMM states.
The authors looked at several sets of attributes and concluded that for each server they
needed both IP and port addresses to achieve the lowest FPR and highest detection
accuracy. They further concluded that having more states available in the data improved
the accuracy.
Akusok, Miche, Hegedus, Nian, and Lendasse (2014) used a two-stage approach
to identify malware, using data from F-Secure, with the goal of minimizing both false
positives and false negatives. Their first stage was based on KNN clustering but still
yielded a high FPR. They then fed the KNN results into two separate ELMs. The data
flagged as malware was fed into a FP minimized ELM and the traffic flagged as clean
was fed into a FN minimizing ELM. The end result using 18,437 data points was a lower
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FPR (2 FPs) with the two-stage approach compared to just using the KNN layer (183
FPs).
Moustafa, Turnbull, and Choo (2018), seeking a solution to better mitigate
malicious events, particularly botnet attacks against protocols used in IoT networks such
as DNS, HTTP, and Message Queue Telemetry Transport, created an ensemble using DT,
NB, ANN, and AdaBoost. Using UNSW-NB15 data, they demonstrated that their
ensemble method had a lower FPR and higher DR compared with each classification
method separately.

Voting Schemes
Voting schemes, in which the output of several classifiers is combined to reach a
conclusion, are popular in pattern recognition. Woods, Kegelmeyer, and Bowyer (1997)
categorize techniques to combine multiple classifiers as either classifier fusion or
dynamic classifier selection. For fusion, the individual classifiers are run in parallel and
then a scheme to reach a group consensus is applied. For dynamic selection, the goal is
to determine which classifier is likely to be correct. They cite several fusion algorithms
including: majority voting, unanimous consensus, thresholding, heuristic polling,
weighted ranking, and others. They proposed an improved approach to dynamic
selection by using a local accuracy scheme.
Lin, Yacoub, Burns, and Simske (2003) demonstrated that a combination of
classifiers can result in significant accuracy improvement and that voting methods are
simple and effective. They also point out that for many applications that there is often
only a marginal, if any, difference in performance between simple voting schemes and
more advanced combination techniques.
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Lin, Lai, Ho, and Tai (2013) believe that to overcome the limitations of a single
IDS, multiple IDSs can be used to more accurately recognize threats. However, the
results of multiple IDSs can often be in conflict. They cite majority voting as a technique
to resolve such conflicts but note that it often leads to inaccurate decisions given that
technique disregards the different domain knowledge of the IDSs in the minority. They
proposed a creditability-based weighted voting scheme to overcome that limitation.

False Alarm Reduction Techniques
Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) cite several reasons for false alarm
generation in IDS including: intrusion activities are sometimes very similar to normal
activities and thus difficult to differentiate, a lack of context data related to the alarm, and
cases where circumstance determine whether an activity is malicious such as a network
scan done by a security administrator versus a hacker. Many IDSs also alarm on attempts
which do not necessarily lead to a compromise. Additionally, an alarm may represent a
stage in a multi-stage attack that may fail in subsequent stages.
One way to throttle false positives is to adjust the alert threshold. But in existing
systems there is usually a trade-off. Less false positives will also cause the system to
miss attacks. Usually, administrators adjust the level to achieve a balance between the
level of security and risk and the resources available to respond to alerts but that is a time
consuming and knowledge intensive task (Wang & Lee, 2001).
Julisch and Dacier (2002) applied data mining techniques to reduce false
positives. They discovered the cost of finding relevant episode rules outweighed the
benefit but did discover interesting patterns such as that IDS alarms are very homogenous
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and repetitive. They concluded that a source host triggering a heterogeneous stream of
alarms is likely an attacker. And that clustering using attribute-oriented induction
produced results that were too general. The authors further suggested that custom made
filtering rules, to automatically discard alarms, or correlation rules, to group alarms, can
help reduce alert volume but that humans should be involved in the analysis to avoid
destroying valuable data.
In a related paper, Julisch (2003) found that a few dozen root causes generally
account for over 90% of alarms and suggested if these were removed, they would allow
operators to concentrate on the remainder. He focused on nine cases including
SYNchronize Flood, Suspicious GET, Host Scan, Fragmented IP, DNS Zone Transfer,
TCP Hijacking, and Code Red. Some of these are still suspicious traffic today but this
list would need to be updated for current threats since Code Red was an artifact of the
time the paper was written.
One of the challenges with IDSs, according to Spathoulas and Katsikas (2010), is
that intrusion methodologies and attack strategies evolve over time with technology.
Large numbers of alerts and false positives are a common problem among almost all
categories of IDSs. While many methods have been used to reduce false positives in
IDSs, research has been evolving to develop effective technologies to classify activity at
an acceptable DR. Spathoulas and Katsikas (2013a) outlined a solution to reduce false
positives by up to 75%. The authors indicate that most false alert reduction research is
focused on post-processing of alerts. A three-part post-processing filter based on their
study of the distribution of false positives in alert sets from Snort was proposed. The first
component, Neighboring Related Alerts, was based on the observation that attacks
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produce bursts of alerts at first as attackers scan for victims and vulnerabilities. The
second component, High Alert Frequency, was based on their observation that attacks
produce anomalies in the distribution of alerts. The third component, Usual False
Positive, was based on false positives usually resulting from the same specific causes.
In a subsequent survey of false positive reduction, alert correlations, and
visualization research, Spathoulas and Katsikas (2013b), put forth that while much
research has been done, a complete solution is still missing and that there are many open
issues and ideas to be explored with post-processing. They believe that any solution must
be adaptable to future attacks, be able to work with other methods, and be efficient
regardless of the IDS being used or the system being protected.
Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) conducted a survey of research on false
alarm minimization techniques for signature-based IDSs. They created a taxonomy of
nine different techniques: signature enhancement, stateful signature-based, vulnerability
signature-based, alarm (data) mining, alert correlation, alert verification, flow analysis,
alert prioritization, and hybrid methods. For alarm mining, the techniques were further
classified as clustering, classification, ANN, and frequent pattern mining. For alert
correlations, their categories included: multi-step, knowledge-based, complimentary
evidence, casual relation, fusion-based, attack graph, and rule-based. They reviewed
commercial Security Information and Event Management systems and noticed that the
majority of those systems use rule-based techniques for event correlation. Despite all of
the research to date, Hubballi and Suryanarayanan (2014) concluded that more research is
needed to address the usability of the proposed techniques in real-world scenarios.
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Zuech et al. (2015) believe that a more comprehensive approach in monitoring
and correlating security events from many different heterogeneous sources can give a
more holistic view and greater situation awareness of cyber threats. Shittu, Healing,
Ghanea-Hercock, Bloomfield, and Rajarajan (2015) used post-correlation prioritization
based on anomaly detection and clustering to reduce false positives. They grouped
related IDS alerts into meta-alerts. Those with higher outlier values indicating a larger
anomaly were given a higher priority. They showed a false positive reduction of 97% in
one scenario and 16% in another using industry data derived from a Snort system from
2012. The large difference between the two scenarios was attributed to lesser distinct
outliers in the second scenario. The authors concluded that additional research is needed
on real-time incremental outlier detection and clustering given their results were based on
a batch analysis.

Situation Awareness
Endsley (1988) first introduced the concept of situation awareness in the context
of human factors research in the aerospace field. Endsley defined situation awareness as
having three components: the first was perception of elements in time and space, the
second was the comprehension of their meaning, and the third their projection into the
future.
Bass (1999) applied situation awareness to the field of intrusion detection, calling
it cybersecurity situational awareness, and proposed that the fusion of multiple sensor
data along with context-dependent threat and vulnerability information could form a
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model for the next generations of IDS. The field of network security situation awareness
evolved from the work of Bass.
In applying situation awareness to intrusion detection, Bass (1999) borrowed the
military concept of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act and multisensory data fusion where
a diverse array of data sources can be employed. He applied this to achieve a higher
cyberspace situation awareness using data fusion for intrusion detection where data
fusion can provide varying levels of data from just being aware of an intrusion up
through analyzing the associated threats and vulnerabilities. His approach included
analyzing data across multiple different device types and data sources concurrently.
Wang, Liu, Lai, and Liang (2007) offered that network security situation awareness seeks
to provide a solution to the high ratio of false positives and associated expensive response
to IDS alerts.
Hutchins et al. (2011) took a military-inspired kill chain model approach to cyber
situation awareness. They asserted that traditional computer defenses alone such as antivirus and IDS are not effective against APTs where the threat actors are often well
resourced, trained, and patient. They proposed an intrusion cyber kill chain that
recognized different phases of an attack, which they defined as: reconnaissance,
weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, C2, and actions on objectives. They
determined that host-based IDSs were the best to detect indications of exploitation and
installation while network-based IDSs were the best to detect weaponization and C2.
Indications of reconnaissance may include host and port scanning activities that could be
detected by IDSs. And indications of actions on objectives could include exfiltration that
could likewise use IDSs for detection.
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While substantial research has been done in intrusion detection for alert
correlation, relatively little has been done for data fusion as compared to other domains
such as military applications (Zuech et al., 2015). Other researchers such as Mees and
Debatty (2015) are attempting to further define situation awareness frameworks for cyber
defense. They argue situation awareness needs to be largely automated given the speed
at which cyber-attacks are executed. They also call for more research on methods for
working with data that may be incomplete, uncertain, or erroneous.
The reconnaissance phase of cyber-attacks includes activities such as finding
target information through web crawling. Huang, Shen, Doshi, Thomas, and Duong
(2015) observed that attackers often attempt to obtain information on a network as a first
step in a cyber-attack. Attackers typically do this through a network scan to discover
network topology and host information such as IP addresses. This is typically followed
by port scans to determine host types and what services are running. This would then
inform the weaponization phase using the kill chain model where an exploit vehicle such
as a Portable Document Format file is chosen. This, in turn, leads to a delivery method
such as via email or a web site download. After the exploit is delivered to the host,
exploitation could be in the form of malware which exploits a vulnerability in processing
files, for example, to install malicious code. Some examples of malware include viruses,
Trojan horses, back doors, worms, root kits, scareware, and spyware (Luh et al., 2016).
Once the attacker’s code is active on the host, a C2 channel is often established to
communicate back to the attacker. The attacker can then take actions such as exfiltration
of data.
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Marchetti et al. (2016) proposed a NIDS based approach to identify weak signals
related to data exfiltration and other Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) activities. They
purported that existing security solutions based on pattern matching work well for
common attacks but can often not identify APTs. This is since APTs use unknown (zeroday) vulnerabilities and seek to hide within normal network traffic. APTs also typically
use only a few internal hosts along with evasion detection techniques such as “low-andslow.” APTs may slowly exfiltrate data over long time periods to avoid detection and use
encryption, which often thwarts signature-based IDSs. The authors list five main phases
of an Advanced Persistent Threat including: reconnaissance, compromise, maintaining
access, lateral movement, and data exfiltration which is similar to the Hutchins et al.
(2011) kill chain model. The compromise phase is typically created through a spear
phishing email with a zero-day exploit where a Remote Administration Tool is usually
installed. The tool then initiates contact with a C2 server since connections initialized by
an internal host are often allowed through a firewall and attract less attention. They used
three features of network traffic to identify hosts potentially involved in data exfiltration:
number of megabytes uploaded by internal hosts to external addresses, number of flows
to external hosts, and the number of external IP addresses related to a connection initiated
by the internal host. APTs are sometimes known as Advanced Targeted Attacks (Luh et
al., 2016).
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C2: Botnets
Botnets are defined as networks of machines compromised by malware. They are
typically composed of hosts from both institutions and consumers that usually do not
know they are infected. They are often used to propagate spam; perform DDoS attacks;
distribute malware; facilitate software piracy, information harvesting, identify theft,
Bitcoin mining, and extortion; and for manipulating online games, surveys, and web
advertising click fraud. Since botnets are made up of many previously non-malicious
hosts, those hosts are often not initially on lists of malicious IP addresses. A common
defensive strategy is to check incoming IP addresses against a list of known bad actors.
These lists are called black lists, watch lists, or Indicator of Compromise lists. They are
often based on IP addresses, signatures such as a Uniform Resource Locator, a malware
hash code based on Message Digest 5, or other similar algorithms. Botnets also allow
attackers to confuse such defenses by launching attacks from a stream of changing IP
addresses.
Some botnets have included in excess of one million hosts under control of “bot
masters” who often rent out their network to malicious actors on a time-sharing basis for
monetary gain. Botnets were initially developed for legitimate activities. The first ones
used Internet Relay Chat as a C2 channel. The first bot of that type, Eggdrop, was
developed in 1993. Bots were quickly adapted for malicious purposes. Examples of
recent malicious botnet related software includes Zeus, often used for hijacking bank
account credentials, which has more than 3,000 variants and is estimated to have infected
3.6 million hosts. Another botnet, Conficker used a Peer-to-Peer architecture to infect an
estimated 10.5 million hosts in 2009.
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Botnets have adapted rapidly and more recent versions, such as Torpig, have
evolved to use techniques such as domain fast flux to take advantage of the DNS protocol
to evade detection via methods such as blacklists. Countermeasure defenses for fast
fluxing include monitoring DNS protocol activity. Once infected, bots or individual
hosts on a botnet exchange messages via an established C2 channel. Such traffic is
usually not high volume and thus avoids detection from many methods. Botnets often
use multiple redundant C2 servers for resiliency in case one is taken out of service.
Anomaly-based methods are considered the main research area for botnets. Detection
includes network traffic anomalies in areas such as latency, traffic volumes, traffic on
unusual ports, and unusual system behavior (Silva, Silva, Pinto, & Salles, 2013). Some
researchers refer to the use of a C2 channel as an “ET Phone Home” protocol where the
host communicates with a botnet controller in a nod to the 1980’s science fiction movie.

Data Preprocessing and Feature Selection
Data preprocessing is an important step in anomaly detection. Such processing
includes data set creation, feature construction, feature reduction or selection, data
transformation (such as converting attributes from nominal to binary and
scaling/normalization), and labeling in the case of supervised learning. Examples of
features for a NIDS could include packet length, destination and source IP and port
addresses, time stamps, and TCP flags.
Feature selection is the process of choosing the best subset of features, sometimes
referred to as attributes or variables, in a given data set. A data set with a large number
of features is termed highly dimensional. Feature selection is often done to alleviate this
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“curse of dimensionality” by removing redundant or irrelevant features to reduce the
computational complexity and cost of an algorithm (Davis & Clark, 2011). Another
benefit of feature selection is to better avoid overfitting in supervised training models
(Saeys, Inza, & Larrañaga, 2007). Feature selection affects the resulting classifier
accuracy, including the FPR (Bahrololum, Salahi, & Khaleghi, 2009), so sometimes a
trade-off between computational complexity and accuracy needs to be evaluated.
Feature selection algorithms can be broadly categorized as either filter or wrapper
methods. Wrapper methods use the classification algorithm itself to evaluate features
while filter methods are independent of the classifier used (Karegowda, Manjunath, &
Jayaram, 2010; Hall, 2000). Some refer to a third category of algorithms as embedded
where feature selection is built into the algorithm as in the case of DTs (Saeys et al.,
2007).
Saeys et al. (2007) cite advantages of filter models as being fast, scalable, and
independent of the classifier with the primary disadvantage being they ignore interactions
with the classifier. Since the filter methods are independent of the classifier, these
methods can be used to perform feature selection once for evaluation of multiple
classifiers. They also further categorize filter methods as univariate, meaning that each
feature is considered separately, or multivariate. A disadvantage of univariate methods is
they ignore dependencies among features which can lead to worse classification
performance. However, several multivariate filter techniques have been proposed to
overcome this. Examples of univariate methods include Chi-square, Euclidean distance,
Gain Ratio, and Information Gain. Multivariate methods include Correlation-based
Feature Selection (CFS) and Markov Blanket Filter.
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Some filter methods perform feature ranking rather than feature selection. They
are often then combined with search methods such as forward selection, backward
elimination, and best-first (Karegowda et al., 2010).
Advantages of wrapper methods include that they are simple and interact with the
classifier. Disadvantages include classifier dependence, being prone to getting stuck in a
local optimum, and the risk of overfitting. Examples of wrapper methods include genetic
algorithms, simulated annealing, and beam search (Saeys et al., 2007).
Substantial research has been done on feature selection and numerous other
algorithms and variations have been proposed. Alhaidari and Zohdy (2018) proposed a
feature pruning model for HMMs and achieved an FPR improvement from 19.16% to
0.38% by reducing the number of features used from UNSW-NB15 to 16. Another
example of a technique used on intrusion detection data sets is gradual feature removal
(Li et al., 2012).

Summary
There is ample literature to support the use of machine learning techniques in
anomaly detection for reducing false positives. However, much research is still being
done using older data sets, such as KDD99, that are not indicative of modern normal and
attack traffic. But, according to Hu et al. (2014), KDD99 is still the most credible data
set to benchmark IDS results. Weller-Fahy et al. (2015) also agree that KDD99 remains
the only comprehensive and fully labeled benchmark data set that is widely used by
researchers.
Thus, the largest gap in the literature is an absence of widely used contemporary
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data sets, reflecting recent cyber-attack methods, for training and testing for IDS
research. While Khammassi and Krichen (2017) state that the NIDS research community
considers UNSW-NB15 a new benchmark data set to be used for evaluations of IDSs, it
will likely take several years for researchers to embrace this and for it to be significantly
demonstrated via the literature. Another common gap is that many researchers do not
provide sufficient details to replicate their research.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
The approach of this research uses the three stages, phases, or levels of situation
awareness as defined by Endsley (1988) and as shown in Figure 1 below. The first level,
perception, was accomplished with a network-based (NIDS) anomaly-detection engine
for intrusion detection using an ELM as the classifier. The ELM classifier monitors the
environment by analyzing the attributes of each event record in search of indications of
cyber-attacks. The ELM classifier only considers events occurring at a discrete point in
time as determined by the duration field in each event record.
The second level, comprehension, was accomplished using HMMs.
Comprehension is about synthesis of information and understanding the bigger picture.
Since the HMMs are trained to evaluate sequences of events over time as opposed to a
single event in time, they provide a more comprehensive view of what is going on in the
monitored network. This also results in a higher level of awareness in recognizing multistage events. Each HMM looks at a specific behavior of a single attribute over time.
The third level, projection, is the decision informed by the perception and
comprehension stages, in space and time, on whether a given alert from the perception
stage should be put forth as an intrusion alert to either a human operator or for automated
actions. Space, for the purposes of this research, is the network space as represented by
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IP addresses, ports, protocols, and services. This phase was implemented as the
combined output of the ELM and HMM classifiers using a unanimous voting scheme.

Figure 1: IDS Model with Situation Awareness Level Boundaries

An ELM was chosen as the classifier for the perception phase based on the
positive results as a classifier for IDS (Fossaceca et al., 2015) compared to other methods
such as SVM. While ELM research only goes back to Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2004) with
the first IDS-based ELM research presented by Cheng et al. (2012), ELM has shown its
versatility to minimize false positives (Zong et al., 2013). Singh, Kumar, and Singla
(2015) also implemented an ELM based solution against two different sets of benchmark
data sets (KDD99 and Kyoto) and achieved superior false positive rates for both
compared to other techniques including ANN, NB, and AdaBoost. Fossaceca et al.
(2015), achieved the lowest false positive rates across categories comparing their ELM
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implementation to 20 other methods in published papers including NB, SVM, Random
Forest, MLP, J48 DT, K-Means, and Self-Organizing Map.
HMMs were chosen for the comprehension phase given their ability to model
temporal events and based on the promising results from other research. HMMs perform
generally better than decision trees and substantially better than neural nets in detecting
complex multi-stage Internet attacks (Ourston et al., 2003). And, HMMs proved to be
very effective at detecting all types of attacks by acting as an anomaly detector over a set
of IDS alarms providing a low rate of false positives and high rate of alarm reduction
(Treinen & Thurimella, 2009) and for differentiating attacks (Zhou et al., 2015). Other
research has also shown the advantages of using HMMs for modeling systems under
attack (P. Bhatt et al., 2014; Gilmore & Haydaman, 2016).
A combined approach was used since prior research has shown positive results in
reducing false positives using post processing (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2013b). Hybrid
results have yielded positive results such as using a KNN followed by ELM (Akusok et
al., 2014) and a NB to HMM (Karthick et al., 2012) for malware detection.
The framework was further informed by existing models such as the kill chain
(Hutchins et al., 2011) and mapped to data elements indicative of relevant cyber-attacks.
The attack stages associated with the kill chain are: reconnaissance, delivery, exploit,
install, C2, and exfiltration. But these stages were distilled into a simpler model of
normal, probe, and attack and implemented in HMMs as three states. The HMMs
provide additional context around interactions with a given network in time, for example,
compared to a more traditional IDS approach which is often making a prediction based
on a single event. This view provides better context for situation awareness since attacks
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can occur over longer periods of time than considered by some traditional IDSs. APTs in
particular often use a low and slow approach to avoid detection.

The Data Set
This research used the UNSW-NB15 data set (Moustafa & Slay, 2015). This met
the research goal of using a recent and relevant set of comprehensive benchmark data,
containing both cyber-attack and normal traffic. This research used two subsets of data
from UNSW-NB15. Their construction along with related UNSW-NB15 data sets is
discussed below.
The Full 2.54M Data Set
The full UNSW-NB15 data set created by Moustafa and Slay (2015) includes
approximately 2.5 Million records of which just over 14% are representative of cyberattack traffic with the rest being normal. It contains nine categories of attack traffic
(fuzzers, analysis, backdoor, DoS, exploit, generic, reconnaissance, shell code, and
worm) and 49 features including two labels with one denoting attack or normal traffic
and the other for the specific attack category. The features are further divided into flow,
basic, content, time, additional generated, and connection features. A complete list of
features is included in Appendix A. This data set is referred to as the Full 2.54M data set
for the purposes of this research.
Moustafa and Slay (2016) validated that UNSW-NB15 is more complex than
KDD99 and thus is a valid benchmark to be used for NIDS evaluations through three
means: statistical analysis, evaluation of feature correlation, and comparison of FAR and
accuracy for five classifiers as compared to KDD99. Khammassi and Krichen (2017)
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also stated that the NIDS research community now considers UNSW-NB15 a new
benchmark for evaluations of IDSs.
The Test and Train Data Set
Moustafa and Slay (2016) accomplished this validation through decomposing
UNSW-NB15 (University of New South Wales, 2015) into a smaller subset of training
and test data sets. That subset consists of 257,673 records which were divided roughly
into 60% for training and 40% for testing per the authors (but closer to 68% and 32%
based on actual records). It includes 164,673 attack records and 93,000 normal records.
Several features of the larger Full 2.54M data set were removed from this subset
including source and destination IP addresses and port numbers along with start and end
record times. To differentiate among UNSW-NB15 subsets, this data is referred to as the
Train and Test dataset for the purposes of this research.
The 440K Data Set
Since this research uses HMMs for temporal situation awareness, it is important
that both the training and testing data reflect an ordered sequence of events in time.
Given the UNSW-NB15 provided Train and Test data subset removed needed time stamp
features, a new set of training and testing data was created from the UNSW-NB15 Full
2.54M data set. A total of 440,044 sequential records, sorted by time stamp, were chosen
from the data set and divided into roughly 60% for training (264,026 records) and 40%
for testing (176,018 records). This data set is referred to as the 440K data set for the
purposes of this research.
The 440K data was split using a simple out-of-sample hold out method. That is
the first 60% of the records sequentially were used for training and the last 40% of the
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records were held out for testing. Cerqueira, Torgo, and Mozetic (2019), in an evaluation
of performance estimation methods for time series forecasting tasks, state that there is no
settled approach among researchers, but that out-of-sample methods are traditionally used
for time-dependent data. Out-of-sample is in contrast to basic cross-validation which
shuffles records which is not conducive to maintaining temporal order. A key
characteristic of out-of-sample methods is that they always preserve the temporal order
which in turn means the resulting model is never tested on past data.
Cerqueira et al. (2019) also reviewed other methods for time-dependent data such
as cross-validation in a blocked form. They concluded that for real-world time series
data, that approaches which maintain the temporal order are better. In particular, they
recommended out-of-sample using repeated holdout.
To further validate this approach, a simplified repeated holdout method was used
for the 440K data where several sections of the Full 2.54M dataset were evaluated in
relation to maintaining a good mix of normal and attack records. This approach also
better approximates a real-world IDS environment where data is ingested sequentially in
time order.
The DoS Data Set
To provide for additional analysis and comparison to other research, another data
set was created from the UNSW-NB15 Train and Test data set for just normal and DoS
traffic. That data set will be referred to as the DoS data set for the purposes of this
research. While not time-ordered, it was used for benchmarking the ELM portion, which
is not time sensitive, and to evaluate the HMM classifiers and overall methodology in
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relation to how it performs with data that is not time-ordered. Table 1 below summarizes
the UNSW-NB15 data sets relevant to this research.

Table 1: UNSW-NB15 Based Data Sets
Dataset
Abbreviation

Description

Full 2.54M

Original Moustafa & Slay (2015) data set
Moustafa & Slay (2016) created training and
Train and Test
testing data set
Sequentially time ordered subset derived from the
440K
Full 2.54M records
DoS and normal traffic extracted from the Train
DoS
and Test subset

# of Records

# of Normal
Records

# of Attack
Records

# of Training
Records

# of Testing
Records

Categories

Includes
Time Stamps

2,540,044

2,218,761

321,283

N/A

N/A

Normal + 9 Attack

Yes

258,673

93,000

165,673

176,341

82,332 Normal + 9 Attack

No

440,044

351,150

88,894

264,026

176,018 Normal + 9 Attack

Yes

109,353

93,000

16,353

68,264

41,089 Normal + DoS

No

Feature Selection
As discussed in the literature review section, feature selection is an important step
in the design of classifiers to remove redundant and irrelevant features. This reduces the
computational complexity and the cost of an algorithm (Davis & Clark, 2011) and affects
the resulting classifier accuracy, including the FPR (Bahrololum et al., 2009).
Given the selection of UNSW-NB15, two feature selection studies for those data
were reviewed. The first (Moustafa & Slay, 2017) was from the data set creators citing
that irrelevant features may cause a higher FAR. They used a hybrid feature selection
technique based on Central Points and Associate Rule Mining. They were able to reduce
the number of features to 11, using the Train and Test data set, which is approximately
25% of the given feature set. The Central Points technique selects the most frequent
values reducing processing time and the Associate Rule Mining helps to remove
irrelevant or noisy features. They pointed out that reducing the number of features to less
than 11 resulted in undesirable results. The second study specific to UNSW-NB15, using
the Train and Test data set, is from Janarthanan and Zargari (2017). They used
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Information Gain (Kayacik, Zincir-Heywood, & Heywood, 2005) and CFS (Hall, 2000)
algorithms to validate the Moustafa and Slay (2017) study and also provided comparisons
to KDD99. Other intrusion detection research has also used Information Gain to select
relevant features (Kayacik et al., 2005).
For this research, the appropriate features for both the ELM and HMM classifiers
were evaluated and chosen using Information Gain and CFS respectively. Information
Gain was chosen for the ELM since it is a filter method which is independent from the
classifiers used. Given that one of the evaluation criterions is to compare the results
against other classifiers, Information Gain allows the same attributes to be used for those
other techniques (Saeys et al., 2007). Since Information Gain is a ranking method, a cutoff or threshold point needed to be determined on where to draw the line to select the
number of attributes. For the first run, the cut-off point was determined using an
informed estimate based on other feature selection studies using UNSW-NB15. An
additional experiment was conducted using backwards feature removal to determine a
cut-off point. Both results were compared.
For the HMM models, CFS was used. This was done to choose a subset of
features in contrast to the ELM model which used Information Gain. One downside of
Information Gain is it is a univariate method which ignores dependencies among features
(Saeys et al., 2007). CFS, in contrast, is a multivariate method which was created on the
basis that good feature subsets are highly correlated with the class yet uncorrelated to
each other (Hall, 2000). For each feature selected by CFS, an HMM was created. This
was done to create a series of classifiers which were then combined using a voting
scheme. As discussed above and shown in Figure 1, the ELM classifier is focused on a
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point in time while the HMM classifiers are focused on temporal patterns. The selection
of CFS provides for classifiers which are highly correlated to the class but uncorrelated to
each other. The feature selection process is depicted in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Feature Selection Process

ELM Classifier
The ELM classifier was built to classify normal and attack traffic using the
UNSW-NB15 data sets shown in Table 1. The basic ELM program (Huang & Zhu,
2004), MATLAB version, was obtained to implement the ELM classifier. MATLAB
was chosen since that is what was used to perform the seminal ELM research (Huang,
Zhu, & Siew, 2004) and many subsequent variations from various researchers have been
made available in MATLAB.
The required inputs for the program are the file names for the training and testing
data sets, ELM type (regression or classification), the number of hidden neurons, and the
activation function. Supported activation functions include: sigmoidal, sine, hardlim,
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triangular basis, and radial basis. The training and testing file input to the ELM program
is in the format of a tab-delimited text file. The first column must contain an integer
label. For binary classification, 0 is used for normal (negative) record and 1 for an attack
(positive) record.
The following preprocessing was done for each data set used for an ELM run.
First, the binary label for attack and normal traffic was moved to be the first column and
the label for attack category was removed. Second, depending on the run, the attributes
not selected by the feature selection process were removed. Third, nominal or categorical
attributes, such as protocol, state, and services for this data set, were converted to binary
attributes as applicable. Fourth, all numeric attributes were normalized to be between -1
and 1 as recommended by Huang and Zhu (2004). Finally, the resulting test and training
data sets were saved as tab-delimited text files.
In terms of other program parameters, the sigmoid activation function was chosen
based on past experience. For ELM Type, the value was set to 1 for classification. The
program also requires the number of hidden neurons as input. Ding et al. (2014) stated
that determining the number of hidden neurons to use for different data sets is an open
problem for ELM researchers. Others have proposed solutions to this (Huang & Chen,
2008; Wang et al., 2018). However, Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2006) demonstrated that
ELM is very stable across a wide range of hidden nodes but performance can degrade
with too few or too many nodes. For this research, different values were experimented
with and charted.
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HMM Architecture
An HMM requires the specification of five parameters including two model
parameters: N (the number of states) and M (the number of distinct observation symbols
per state) and three probability measures: A (the state transition probability distribution),
B (the observation symbol emission probability distribution), and p (the initial state
distribution). In compact notation form, an HMM is often written as λ = (A, B, π)
(Rabiner, 1989).
Various values of N (states) have been used for intrusion detection in the
literature. Ourston et al. (2003) distilled a multi-stage attack sequence to four states:
probe, consolidate, exploit, and compromise. Karthick et al. (2012) used TCP state flags
as HMM symbols. Zhou et al. (2015) used three states: normal, fault, and attack.
Hurley, Perdomo, and Perez-Pons (2016) used three states for a NIDS for Software
Defined Networks: expected, unexpected, and somewhat expected. Liang et al. (2017)
chose four states: good, probed, attacked, and compromised. Based on the nine labeled
attack categories plus normal from the UNSW-NB15 data set, this research used:
normal, probe (corresponding to analysis, fuzzers, and reconnaissance instances), and
attack (corresponding to backdoor, DoS, exploit, generic, shell code, and worm
instances). The number of distinct symbols per state, M, was based the results of the
feature selection for the HMMs. The HMM state transition representation is shown in
Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: HMM State Transition Representation
For each HMM classifier, which represents one feature, symbols were selected,
using the letters of the alphabet, to represent each possible feature value or range of
values for the feature. Each symbol was mapped to its state, either normal, probe, or
attack, for each record in the training data.
The probabilities were then determined through training using the Baum-Welch
algorithm (Rabiner, 1989), which is the most commonly used HMM training algorithm
(Holgado, Villagra, & Vazquez, 2017). For execution of the HMMs against the test data,
the emission symbols for each model, as represented by one feature, were translated from
their respective attributes. These symbol streams were then run through the Viterbi
algorithm (Viterbi, 1967; Forney, 1973) to determine the most likely states.
The HMMs were implemented using the machine learning tool kit in MATLAB
(Theodoridis, Pikrakis, Koutroumbas, & Cavouras, 2010). Training was performed using
the hmmestimate and hmmtrain functions. Testing was performed with the hmmviterbi
function.
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The Combined Classifier
The third phase, projection, was the combined output of the HMMs and ELM
providing both a projection in time and space. A unanimous voting scheme was chosen
for the final output. Lin et al. (2003) demonstrated that a combination of classifiers can
result in a significant accuracy improvement and that the use of voting methods to
combine those classifiers are both simple and effective.
A unanimous voting scheme was chosen with the goal of eliminating false
positives. Thus, all of the classifiers must agree on an attack. Other voting schemes such
as majority voting can lead to an inaccurate decision given the knowledge of the minority
classifiers are effectively ignored (Lin, Lai, Ho, & Tai, 2013). More complicated voting
schemes were discounted given prior research that there is only a marginal, if any,
difference in performance between simple voting schemes and more advanced
combination techniques (Lin et al., 2003).

Experiments
Two groups of experiments were conducted and referenced as Experiments A and
B. Experiment A used the 440K Data Set. The 440K Data Set was used to provide the
time ordered data needed to demonstrate the temporal awareness capabilities of the
HMMs.
Experiment B used the DoS data set. This was done for three reasons. The first
was to use the Moustafa & Slay (2016) Test and Train dataset for which they justified the
complexity of the data set and its validity for the evaluation of NIDS research. Although,
many of their findings that are applicable to the Test and Train data set should also be
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applicable to the larger 440K Data Set as well. The second was to determine how the
ELM and HMM scheme with situation awareness performed with data that were not
time-ordered. And the third was to provide a more direct comparison to other research.
In particular, Igbe (2019) had shown very good results using an Artificial Immune
System scheme to detect DoS attacks using the UNSW-NB15 Test and Train dataset.
For the ELM models, multiple runs were done since the input biases and weights
that connect the inputs to the hidden layer are chosen randomly for the basic ELM
algorithm. Thus, each run will produce a different result but usually within a range.
Wang and Huang (2005) used a similar process for their ELM research using an average
of 50 simulation runs. For this research, ten runs were used. Additionally, each
experiment also included comparisons to two other classifiers using the same data: an
MLP and an J48 DT.
Feature selection for the ELM, J48 DT, and MLP runs was done using
Information Gain which provides a ranked list of features in order of merit. The method
used to select the features from the ranked list was backwards elimination with a cut-off
point based on an estimate informed by other research which used the UNSW-NB15 data
sets. An alternate to the informed estimate for a cut-off point was performed through an
iterative search for contrast.
The feature selection method for the HMMs was CFS which provided a subset
selection. For each feature selected in the CFS subset, a separate HMM was created.
The number of hidden neurons for the ELM models was initially chosen based on prior
experience. A second evaluation was done to determine an optimal value through
iterative search.
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Evaluation Criteria
The primary evaluation metric was the FPR given the primary goal of this
research was to reduce false positives. This was measured based on the results of running
three algorithms using the same data sets. The algorithms were: ELM alone, HMM
alone, and the combination of ELM with HMM. The goal was to show that the
combination of ELM with HMM produces a lower FPR than ELM alone by more than
10%. Accuracy was also calculated to ensure that was not significantly impacted.
Both experiments show the results of the ELM and HMM classifiers along with
the combined output with the confusion matrix variables TP, FP, TN, and FN in a table.
FPR and Accuracy were also calculated. Results of the J48 DT and MLP were also
shown for the respective runs to provide comparisons.
As discussed in earlier sections, the decision to not use an older data set such as
KDD99 limited the ability to compare this proposed research to specific FPRs from prior
published studies. However, results from other research using various subsets of the
UNSW-NB15 data set is also shown for contrast.

Computing Resources Used
This research was conducted using a MacBook Pro running MacOS with a 2.6
GHz Intel Core i7 Central Processing Unit, 16 Gigabytes of Random Access Memory,
and a 750 Gigabyte hard drive. The hard drive provided sufficient swap space needed to
support some of the large matrix calculations required of this research.
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Summary
In this section, the research methodology using both ELM and HMMs in a
situation awareness framework was detailed and justified. Feature selection using
information gain and CFS was also chosen and justified. A data set, UNSW-NB15, to
meet the goal of using one indicative of modern normal and attack traffic was also chosen
and justified. The resources used along with evaluation criteria and metrics, including
achieving a lower FPR with the combined classifier compared to the ELM or HMM
classifiers individually were provided.
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Chapter 4
Results

This chapter provides the results of the experiments designed to gauge the
effectiveness of using ELM in conjunction with HMM with a situation awareness
framework to reduce false positives. These experiments used subsets of the UNSWNB15 data set (Moustafa & Slay, 2015). UNSW-NB15 was chosen to meet the stated
research goal of using a recent and relevant set of comprehensive benchmark data,
containing both cyber-attack and normal traffic.
The first experiment, Experiment A, used the 440K data set which is a timeordered subset of the UNSW-NB15 data set. A time-ordered data set was needed to test
the effectiveness of the HMMs per the situation awareness framework.
The second experiment, Experiment B, used a subset of the separate Train and
Test data set, the DoS data set, that included both DoS attack and normal traffic. The
Train and Test data set was validated as being statistically complex for evaluating
existing and novel techniques for NIDS (Moustafa & Slay, 2016); however, it was not
time-ordered.

Experiment A (Time-Ordered Data)
Experiment A was repeated twice. Both runs were conducted against the 440K
subset of the UNSW-NB15 data set (Moustafa & Slay, 2015). Both used Information
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Gain to select the features for the ELM and CFS to select the features for the HMMs.
The difference between the two runs were in the number of features and the number of
hidden neurons used by the ELM model. For the first run, the number of features
selected for the ELM was determined by a cut-off threshold of 18 that was informed by
other researchers and past experience and the number of hidden neurons was selected at
60 based on past experience. For the second run, a mini-experiment was run to more
optimally determine a number of features, 24, and hidden neurons, 125, to use. The
HMMs remained the same for both runs.
Data Analysis
As discussed in the methodology section, a new data set, named 440K, was
created from the full UNSW-NB15 data sets (Full 2.54M). A total of 440,044 sequential
records, sorted by time stamp, were chosen from the data set and divided into roughly
60% for training (264,026 records) and 40% for testing (176,018 records). The data set
characteristics for normal and attack traffic are shown in Table 2 below and the
distribution of the attack categories is given in Table 3.

Table 2: Distribution of Training and Test Data by Traffic Type (440K Data Set)
Traffic Type
Normal
Attack
Total

Training
214,202
49,824
264,026

Testing
136,948
39,070
176,018

Total
351,150
88,894
440,044

74
Table 3: Distribution of Training and Test Data by Attack Type (440K Data Set)
Attack Type
Reconnaissance
Exploits
DoS
Generic
Shellcode
Fuzzers
Backdoor
Worms
Analysis
Total

Training
2,074
6,901
2,609
34,119
227
3,168
351
27
348
49,824

Testing
1,456
4,538
2,298
27,759
144
2,222
315
16
322
39,070

Total
3,530
11,439
4,907
61,878
371
5,390
666
43
670
88,894

Feature Selection
Two feature selection algorithms, Information Gain (Kayacik et al., 2005) and
CFS (Hall, 2000) were run against the training data set to evaluate all 47 non-labeled
features. The Information Gain ranking of the 47 features is included in Appendix B.
The CFS evaluation returned a subset of only two features: sttl and ct_state_ttl
which are attributes 10 and 37 respectively in Appendix A. Those two features were used
to construct two HMMs.
For Information Gain, a cut-off threshold of the first 18 features with the highest
ranked merit were chosen for the first run. The lower limit for the number of features
was informed by prior feature selection research for UNSW-NB15 and prior experience.
Moustafa and Slay (2017) cautioned that reducing the number of features to less than 11
resulted in undesirable results.
To illustrate a more precise cut-off determination, a mini-experiment was done
with a backwards feature removal technique to determine the cut-off threshold. A model
was run 47 times varying the cut-off threshold from 47 to one. The resulting Accuracy
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and FPR are shown in figures 4 and 5 respectively below. The highest Accuracy
(0.9886) was achieved at a cut-off at 24 features which corresponded to an FPR of
0.0068.
Accuracy by # of Features (440K Data Set)
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Figure 4: Accuracy by # of Features (440K Data Set)
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Figure 5: FPR by # of Features (440K Data Set)
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A separate mini-experiment was conducted to gauge the impact of the number of
hidden neurons on Accuracy and FPR. The number of hidden neurons for the ELM
model was varied from one to 160. The results for Accuracy and FPR are shown
respectively in figures 6 and 7 below. The highest Accuracy (0.9823) occurred at 125
nodes which corresponded to an FPR of 0.0170.
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Figure 6: Accuracy by # of ELM Hidden Neurons (440K Data Set)
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Figure 7: FPR by # of ELM Hidden Neurons (440K Data Set)
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HMM Construction
In compact notation, an HMM is notated as λ = (A, B, π) (Rabiner, 1989) where N
is the number of states, M is the number of symbols per state, A is the state transition
probability, B is the observation symbol emission probability distribution, and p is the
initial state distribution.
Both of the created HMMs share the same three states: normal, probe
(corresponding to the analysis, fuzzers, and reconnaissance categories), and attack
(corresponding to the backdoor, DoS, exploit, generic, shell code, and worm categories).
The probe and attack states combined represent all of the attack traffic. The three states
are represented by N for Normal, P for Probe, and A for Attack.
For the first HMM (HMM S), the symbols represented all of the possible values
for sttl (attribute 10 in Appendix A) which is source to destination Time to Live. This
feature is an integer with values between 0 and 255. For the data set, there were 11
distinct values (the M variable for the HMM). These were represented by symbols
labeled A through K.
For the second HMM (HMM C) the symbols represent the possible values for
ct_state_ttl (attribute 37 in Appendix A) which is a derived value based on state and both
destination to source and source to destination Time to Live. This feature is an integer
with values between 0 and 6 and has 5 distinct values (the M variable for the HMM) in
the data set. These were represented by symbols labeled A through E. Since the two
HMMs are separate, there was no conflict with the reuse of the same letters to represent
the symbols.
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The training of each of the HMMs was performed using similar steps using the
training data set. First, the attack category value of each record was translated to the state
value (N, A, or P). Then the corresponding feature (either sttl or ct_state_ttl) was
mapped to their appropriate symbols. The training file with the known states and given
symbols was then used to estimate the initial state distribution (π) and the symbol
emission probability distribution (B) using the MATLAB hmmestimate function, which
is part of the MATLAB machine learning tool kit (Theodoridis, Pikrakis, Koutroumbas,
& Cavouras, 2010). These data were then trained using the Baum-Welch algorithm
(Rabiner, 1989), which is the most commonly used HMM training algorithm (Holgado et
al., 2017), via the MATLAB hmmtrain function. The resulting parameters for the
training of each HMM are included in Appendix C.
For the execution of the HMMs against the test data, the emission symbols for
each model were translated from their respective feature. These symbol streams were
then run through the Viterbi algorithm (Viterbi, 1967; Forney, 1973) to determine the
most likely states using the MATLAB hmmviterbi function. The results were then output
to a file for each model for further processing with the ELM model.
The ELM Model
The basic ELM program was modified to provide an output file containing a zero
or one predicted value for each row in the test data set for further use in the combination
phase. The ELM model was run multiple times following the process outlined in the
methodology section.
For experiment A, the ELM model was run once using 18 features and 60 hidden
neurons to create a baseline. That model was named ELM1. An additional 10 ELM
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models were created and labeled ELM2 to ELM11. Models ELM1 to ELM11 all used 18
features with 60 hidden neurons. A new set of ELM models, ELM12 to ELM21, was
then created using 24 features with 125 hidden neurons.
The Combined Model
The combined model represents the third situation awareness phase, projection,
and is the combined output of the HMMs and ELM providing both a projection in time
and space. To eliminate false positives, the outputs of the two HMMs and the ELM
classifier were combined using a unanimous voting scheme and resulted in an attack only
if all three agreed. Otherwise, the record would be considered normal.
Three ELM models where chosen for combination with the HMMs: ELM1,
ELM11, and ELM14. ELM1 was chosen since it was the baseline. ELM11 was chosen
since it had the lowest FPR among for the ELMs created using 18 features with 60 hidden
neurons. ELM14 was chosen since it had the lowest FPR for the ELMs created with 24
features using 125 hidden neurons.
The combined models were denoted as ELM + HMM followed by the HMMs.
So, ELM11+HMM C&S is the combined output of ELM11, HMM C, and HMM S.
Comparison to Other Classifier Models
To provide a comparison to other classifiers, the same training and testing data
was used with a J48 DT and an MLP. These are labeled as J48-1 and MLP1 using 18
features and J48-2 and MLP2 using 24 features.
Findings
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For each model, the confusion matrix variables TP, TN, FP, and FN were
calculated along with FPR and Accuracy. The results sorted by highest FPR to lowest
FPR are displayed in Table 4 below.
This shows that the combined model outperformed the individual models and
other classifiers for both the 18 feature (ELM11 + HMM C&S) and 24 feature (ELM14 +
HMM C&S) models. Table 5 provides a summary view of how the results compared to
the primary and secondary goals.

Table 4: Experiment A Results Sorted by Highest to Lowest FPR
Model
ELM1
ELM9
ELM10
MLP1
ELM3
ELM18
ELM12
ELM17
ELM5
ELM4
ELM20
ELM16
ELM6
ELM13
ELM21
ELM7
ELM19
MLP2
ELM8
ELM2
ELM15
HMM S
J48-1
ELM11
ELM14
ELM1 + HMM S
HMM C
ELM1 + HMM C
ELM1 + HMM C&S
J48-2
ELM14 + HMM S
ELM11 + HMM S
ELM14 + HMM C
ELM14 + HMM C&S
ELM11 + HMM C
ELM11 + HMM C&S

Features
18
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
18
18
24
24
18
24
24
18
24
24
18
18
24
1
18
18
24
18
1
18
18
24
24
18
24
24
18
18

TN
133168
133307
133485
133529
133742
133779
133790
133805
133885
133898
133929
133934
134081
134127
134129
134148
134184
134201
134201
134302
134305
134597
134776
134780
134915
134938
135643
135767
135942
136014
136060
136074
136527
136528
136563
136565

FP
3780
3641
3463
3419
3206
3169
3158
3143
3063
3050
3019
3014
2867
2821
2819
2800
2764
2747
2747
2646
2643
2351
2172
2168
2033
2010
1305
1181
1006
934
888
874
421
420
385
383

FN
547
573
749
394
762
450
918
833
1032
979
791
3300
827
708
2895
730
749
761
987
992
799
337
775
761
1212
856
651
1045
1045
1078
1498
1058
1716
1716
1359
1359

TP
38523
38497
38321
38676
38308
38620
38152
38237
38038
38091
38279
35770
38243
38362
36175
38340
38321
38309
38083
38078
38271
38733
38295
38309
37858
38214
38419
38025
38025
37992
37572
38012
37354
37354
37711
37711

Accuracy
0.9754
0.9761
0.9761
0.9783
0.9775
0.9794
0.9768
0.9774
0.9767
0.9771
0.9784
0.9641
0.9790
0.9800
0.9675
0.9799
0.9800
0.9801
0.9788
0.9793
0.9804
0.9847
0.9833
0.9834
0.9816
0.9837
0.9889
0.9874
0.9883
0.9886
0.9864
0.9890
0.9879
0.9879
0.9901
0.9901

FPR
0.0276
0.0266
0.0253
0.0250
0.0234
0.0231
0.0231
0.0230
0.0224
0.0223
0.0220
0.0220
0.0209
0.0206
0.0206
0.0204
0.0202
0.0201
0.0201
0.0193
0.0193
0.0172
0.0159
0.0158
0.0148
0.0147
0.0095
0.0086
0.0073
0.0068
0.0065
0.0064
0.0031
0.0031
0.0028
0.0028
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Table 5: Summary of Results Compared to Goals for Experiment A
Primary Goals
FPR Reduction of 10%
Compared to ELM Alone
%
Reduction in
FPR
Goal Met
Model
ELM11 + HMM C&S
ELM14 + HMM C&S

-82.33%
-79.34%

Yes
Yes

Secondary Goals

FPR less than 0.6%
FPR Less
than 0.6%

Goal Met

0.28%
0.31%

Yes
Yes

FPR vs. MLP
FPR
Difference
vs. MLP
Goal Met
-88.80%
-84.71%

Yes
Yes

FPR v. J48 DT
FPR
Difference
v. J48 DT Goal Met
-82.37%
-55.03%

Yes
Yes

Accuracy v. ELM Alone
Accuracy
Change
0.69%
0.46%

Improved/
Reduced
Improved
Improved

Experiment B (Non-Time Ordered Data)
Experiment B is similar to Experiment A. The primary difference is that the DoS
data set was used.
Data Analysis
As discussed in the methodology section, a new data set, named DoS, was created
from the UNSW-NB15 Test and Train data set. Table 6 below shows the distribution of
traffic by normal and attack. The Training and Testing split follows the original Test and
Train data set split of roughly 60% for Training and 40% for Testing. The only attack
category included in this data set was DoS.
Table 6: Distribution of DoS Data by Traffic Type (DoS Data Set)
Traffic Type
Normal
Attack
Total

Training
56,000
12,264
68,264

Testing
37,000
4,089
41,089

Total
93,000
16,353
109,353

Feature Selection
The UNSW-NB15 Train and Test data set from which the DoS data set was
derived has less features than the Full 2.45M data set. In particular, the authors removed
features such as source and destination IP address and ports and record start and end time
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were removed. The list of available features in the Train and Test data set is included in
Appendix D.
The CFS evaluation returned a subset of four features: sttl, proto, dttl, and
ct_dst_sport_ltm which are features 10, 2, 11, and 35 respectively in Appendix D. From
those, 3 HMMs were built: sttl (HMM DS), dttl (HMM DD), and ct_dst_sport_ltm
(HMM DC).
A similar process was followed as for Experiment A using Information Gain and
CFS. The result of the Information Gain ranking for the DoS data set is shown in
Appendix E. The optimal number of features using a backwards cut-off threshold with
Accuracy as a determination was 11 which had an Accuracy of 0.9855 and an FPR of
0.0071. Graphs of Accuracy by features and FPR respectively for the DoS data set is
shown in figures 8 and 9 below.
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Figure 8: Accuracy by # of Features (DoS Data Set)
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FPR by # of Features (DoS Data Set)
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Figure 9: FPR by # of Features (DoS Data Set)

Effect of Number of ELM Hidden Neurons on Accuracy and FPR
As with experiment A, to determine an optimal number of hidden neurons for the
ELM, both Accuracy and FPR were evaluated as the number of hidden neurons was
increased from 1 to 160. The highest Accuracy occurred at 144 hidden neurons which
corresponded to an FPR of 0.0006. This is shown in figures 10 and 11 below.
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Figure 10: Accuracy by # of ELM Hidden Neurons (DoS Data Set)
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Figure 11: FPR by # of ELM Hidden Neurons (DoS Data Set)
HMM Construction
For this experiment, 3 HMMs were built. The same process as outlined in
Experiment A above was used. The three states were represented by N for Normal, P for
Probe, and A for Attack. However, since this experiment only used DoS and Normal
traffic, the only states expected would be N and A.
For the first HMM (HMM DS), the symbols represented all of the possible values
for sttl (attribute 10 in Appendix D) which is source to destination Time to Live. This
feature is an integer with values between 0 and 255. For the DoS data set, there were 13
distinct values (the M variable for the HMM). These were represented by symbols
labeled A through M.
For the second HMM (HMM DC) the symbols represent the possible values for
ct_dst_sport_ltm (attribute 35 in Appendix D) which is a derived feature involving the
number of connections between the same destination address and source port. This
feature is an integer. There were 16 unique values for this field (the M variable for the
HMM). These were represented by symbols labeled A through P.
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For the third HMM (HMM DD) the symbols represent the possible values for dttl
(attribute 11 in Appendix D) which is the destination to source Time to Live value. This
feature is an integer which can vary from 0 to 255. There were 9 unique values for this
field (the M variable for the HMM). These were represented by symbols labeled A
through I.
As with experiment A, since the HMMs are separate, there was no conflict with
the reuse of the same letters to represent the symbols. The training of each of the three
HMMs was performed using the same steps as outlined for Experiment A above. The
resulting parameters for these HMMs are included in Appendix F.
The ELM Model
For experiment B, the ELM model was run 10 times. The resulting models were
named ELMD1 to ELMD10 with the number of hidden neurons set at 144.
The Combined Model
The combined model represents the third situation awareness phase, projection,
and is the combined output of the three HMMs and ELM9 providing both a projection in
time and space. To eliminate false positives, the outputs of the three HMMs and the
ELM classifier were combined using a unanimous voting scheme and resulted in an
attack only if all three agreed. Otherwise, the record would be considered normal. The
result is labeled ELMD9 + HMM DS, DD, & DC.
Comparison to Other Models
To provide a comparison to other classifiers, the same training and testing data
was used with a J48 DT and an MLP. These are labeled as J48 D and MLP D.
Findings
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For each model, the confusion matrix variables TP, TN, FP, and FN were
calculated along with FPR and Accuracy. The results sorted by highest FPR to lowest
FPR are displayed in Table 7 below. Table 8 provides a summary view of how the
results compared to the primary and secondary goals.
Table 7: Experiment B Results Sorted by Highest to Lowest FPR
Model
HMM DD
HMM DS
HMM DC
J48 D
ELMD5
ELMD8
ELMD4
ELMD6
ELMD2
ELMD3
ELMD1
ELMD7
ELMD10
ELMD9
ELMD9 + HMM DS, DD, & DC
MLP D

TN
16932
16932
34677
36737
36909
36916
36926
36928
36936
36941
36943
36943
36954
36956
37000
37000

FP
20068
20068
2323
263
91
84
74
72
64
59
57
57
46
44
0
0

FN
2
0
989
332
890
885
887
893
902
900
911
894
890
840
1361
1235

TP
4087
4089
3100
3757
3199
3204
3202
3196
3187
3189
3178
3195
3199
3249
2728
2854

Accuracy
0.5115
0.5116
0.9194
0.9855
0.9761
0.9764
0.9766
0.9765
0.9765
0.9767
0.9764
0.9769
0.9772
0.9785
0.9669
0.9699

FPR
0.5424
0.5424
0.0628
0.0071
0.0025
0.0023
0.0020
0.0019
0.0017
0.0016
0.0015
0.0015
0.0012
0.0012
0.0000
0.0000

Table 8: Summary of Results Compared to Goals for Experiment B
Primary Goals
FPR Reduction of 10%
Compared to ELM Alone
FPR less than 0.6%
%
Reduction in
FPR less
FPR
Goal Met
than 0.6% Goal Met
Model
ELMD9 + HMM DC & DD & DS

-100.00%

Yes

0.00%

Yes

Secondary Goals
FPR vs. MLP
FPR
Difference
vs. MLP
Goal Met
0.00% Yes / Tied

FPR v. J48 DT
FPR
Difference
v. J48 DT Goal Met
-100.00%

Yes

Accuracy v. ELM Alone
Accuracy
Change
-1.19%

Improved/
Reduced
Reduced
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Training and Test Time Comparisons
Table 9 below provides a summary of CPU times for training and testing both the
440K and DoS data sets using the same hardware. ELM outperforms J48 DT, HMM,
and MLP in terms of training time. MLP takes orders of magnitude longer to train than
ELM, J48 DT, or HMM.
Table 9: Training & Testing CPU Time Comparison by Classifier

Data Set

440K

DoS

Attributes

Classifier

24 ELM (average, n=10)
24 J48 DT
1 HMM (average, n=2)
ELM + HMM
24 MLP
11 ELM (average, n=10)
11 J48 DT
1 HMM (average, n=3)
ELM + HMM
11 MLP

Training
Time (s)
2.95
37.50
139.66
282.27
30213.62
0.97
3.14
6.09
19.24
13058.10

Testing
Time (s)
0.56
0.09
0.26
1.08
11.91
0.19
0.03
0.05
0.34
4.13

Comparisons to Other Literature
For additional comparison purposes, Table 10 lists results from 17 research papers
published between 2017 and 2019, including a total of 44 algorithms, that were based on
the UNSW-NB15 data sets. All included FPR and most included Accuracy results. In
some cases, FRP and Accuracy were derived from provided confusion matrices. Care
was taken to review the FPR formula used in each paper, to ensure a valid comparison,
since some researchers referred to FPR as FAR or Fall Out. Additionally, seven of the
key results from Tables 4 and 7 were also replicated in Table 10 for comparison
purposes.
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Table 10: Comparisons to Other Research Using UNSW-NB15 Data Sorted by FPR
Reference

UNSW-NB15 Data Set

Algorithm

Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Wang, Xu, Lee, & Lee (2018)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Wang, Xu, Lee, & Lee (2018)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Valero León (2017)
Benmessahel, Xie, Chellal, & Semong (2019)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Vinayakumar, et al. (2019)
Wang, Xu, Lee, & Lee (2018)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, & Yang (2019)
Yang, Zheng, Wu, Niu, & Yang (2019)
Benmessahel, Xie, Chellal, & Semong (2019)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Benmessahel, Xie, Chellal, & Semong (2019)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Tama & Rhee (2019)
Valero León (2017)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Kamarudin, Maple, Watson, & Safa (2017)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Kamarudin, Maple, Watson, & Safa (2017)
Muna, Moustafa, & Sitnikova (2018)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Bamakan, Wang, & Shi (2017)
Moustafa, Creech, & Slay (2017)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Moustafa, Slay, & Creech (2017)
Tchakoucht & Ezziyyani (2018)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Moustafa, Adi, Turnbull, & Hu (2018)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Tama & Rhee (2019)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Vinayakumar, et al. (2019)
This Research (from Table 4)
Bamakan, Wang, & Shi (2017)
This Research (from Table 4)
This Research (from Table 4)
This Research (from Table 4)
Moustafa, Turnbull, & Choo (2018)
Igbe (2019)
This Research (from Table 7)
This Research (from Table 4)
Alhaidari & Zohdy (2018)
This Research (from Table 4)
This Research (from Table 4)
This Research (from Table 7)
This Research (from Table 7)

Train & Test Subset
Train (50%) & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train (50%) & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Full 2.54M records
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset (Normal Traffic)
Train (25%) & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Inferred Full 2.54M records
Train & Test Subset
Inferred Full 2.54M records
Subset 20%
Full 2.54M records
Inferred Full 2.54M records
Subset 27K records
DNS Traffic Subset
Subset 27K records
Train & Test Subset
DNS Traffic Subset
Inferred Full 2.54M records
Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
DNS Traffic Subset
Inferred Train & Test Subset
Train & Test Subset
Inferred Full 2.54M records
HTTP Traffic Subset
HTTP Traffic Subset
Inferred Full 2.54M records
HTTP Traffic Subset
Subset 20%
HTTP Traffic Subset
Train & Test Subset (Normal Traffic)
Subset 440K records
Train & Test Subset
Subset 440K records
Subset 440K records
Subset 440K records
DNS Traffic Subset
Train & Test (DoS)
Train & Test (DoS)
Subset 440K records
Training/Testing (80%/20%)
Subset 440K records
Subset 440K records
Train & Test (DoS)
Train & Test (DoS)

SVM
MLP
Multinominal NB
C-ELM (CAI)
ANN
Snort (signature-based)
ANN w/ Genetic Algorithm
Deep Belief Network
Deep Neural Network
SVM
KNN
RF
Deep Neural Network
Deep Belief Network
ANN w/ Particle Swarm Optimization
KNN
ANN w/ Locust Swarm Optimization
SVM
Gradient Boosted Machine (hold out)
DT
Classification & Regression Tree
Random Forest DT w/ AdaBoost
NB
Random Forest DT w/ LogitBoost
Deep Auto Encoder
ANN
Random Forest
SVM
Finite Dirichlet Mixture Model
DT
Beta Mixture Model
Recurrent Neural Network
Outlier Gaussian Mixture
ANN
NB
Beta Mixture HMM
DT
Gradient Boosted Machine (10 fold)
Ensemble
NB
MLP1
SVM
MLP2
DT (J48 - 1)
ELM11
Ensemble
Artificial Immune System
J48 D
DT (J48 - 2)
HMM
ELM14 + HMM C&S
ELM11 + HMM C&S
ELM9 + HMM DS, DD, &DC
MLP D

FPR
0.4164
0.4029
0.3800
0.3646
0.3611
0.3066
0.2910
0.2788
0.2640
0.2554
0.2519
0.2315
0.1901
0.1715
0.1478
0.1148
0.0940
0.0873
0.0860
0.0857
0.0851
0.0830
0.0825
0.0822
0.0820
0.0787
0.0656
0.0612
0.0588
0.0522
0.0510
0.0510
0.0472
0.0426
0.0418
0.0382
0.0343
0.0297
0.0258
0.0250
0.0250
0.0246
0.0201
0.0159
0.0158
0.0138
0.0134
0.0071
0.0068
0.0038
0.0031
0.0028
0.0000
0.0000

Accuracy
0.7936
0.8161
0.7675
0.8274
0.8329
0.6087
0.8644
0.8602
0.7970
0.8587
0.8538
0.8756
0.8908
0.9021
0.9242
0.8664
0.9542
0.9260
0.9131
0.9228
0.9023
0.9027
0.9117
0.9033
0.9240
0.9261
0.9372
0.8465
0.9430
0.9532
0.9280
-0.9519
0.9627
0.9591
0.9632
0.9713
0.9508
0.9897
0.8370
0.9783
0.9352
0.9801
0.9833
0.9834
0.9954
0.9811
0.9855
0.9886
0.9641
0.9879
0.9901
0.9669
0.9699
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Summary of Results
The primary evaluation metric for this research was FPR. For Experiment A
(time-ordered data), Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the combined model of ELM with
HMMs in a situation awareness framework using a unanimous voting scheme achieved
the goals of an FPR reduction of 10%, an FPR under 0.6%, and a better FPR than either a
J48 DT or MLP classifier using the same data sets. This was achieved for both models
using 18 attributes as well as 24 attributes. However, the difference between 18 and 24
attributes and 60 and 125 hidden neurons was not overly significant as shown in Table 4.
For experiment B, which was using DoS traffic (non-time ordered), the primary
goals of an FPR reduction of 10% and an FPR under 0.6% were also met. The secondary
goals of a better FPR than either a J48 DT or MLP classifier were achieved for the J48
DT but resulted in a tie for the MLP classifier since both solutions had an FPR of 0%.
With the FPR being 0%, that was a 100% reduction from ELM alone but that resulted in
a slight degraded Accuracy rate. Also, for experiment B, two of the three HMMs had a
perfect and almost perfect TPR but very poor FPR performance. However, due to the
unanimous voting scheme, the very high rates of false positives were cancelled out for
the overall ensemble.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Summary, Implications, & Recommendations

This research demonstrates that false positives can be better minimized, while
maintaining detection accuracy, by combining ELM and HMMs as classifiers within the
context of a situation awareness framework. This research was performed using the
UNSW-NB15 data set which is more representative of contemporary cyber-attack and
normal network traffic than older data sets typically used in IDS research. It is shown
that this approach provides better results than either HMM or ELM alone and with a
lower FPR than other comparable approaches that also used the UNSW-NB15 data set.

Conclusions
The overall approach proved effective for both time-ordered and non-time ordered
data but for likely different reasons. For the 440K data set, the two HMMs demonstrated
very good Accuracy rates even as a single attribute classifier. The Accuracy was 0.9889
and 0.9847 for HMMs C and S respectively. The Information Gain merit for those
attributes, from Appendix B, was 0.614 and 0.593 respectively which wouldn’t seem to
support those type of Accuracy results. Thus, the Accuracy is likely due to a boost in
predictive ability due to patterns in the time sequence data associated with each of those
attributes.

91

However, for the DoS data set, two of the HMMs, DS and DD, both had poor
Accuracy rates of 0.5424 and very high FPRs. DS was also constructed from the feature
sttl which is the same feature used for HMM S for the 440K data set. For the DoS data
set sttl showed an Information Gain merit of 0.300 (Appendix E). HMM DD was created
from feature dttl, destination Time to Live, and had a merit of 0.316. The overall result
would seem to indicate that there was no temporal pattern to boost the individual
Accuracy. The third HMM, HMM DC, based on feature ct_dst_sport_ltm had a merit of
only 0.165 but performed much better as a single attribute classifier with an Accuracy of
0.9194 as compared to HMMs DS & DD. Overall, the poor HMM individual
performance from the DoS data set as compared to the 440K data set supports evidence
of a temporal pattern in the time-ordered data. Given most real-world IDSs ingest such
time ordered data, this boosts the case for evaluations using time-ordered data sets vs.
those that have been shuffled from techniques such as cross-validation.
Of other note for feature selection is that sttl showed up in the CFS selection
subsets for both 440K and DoS. This is likely since sttl was noted as being a feature that
has relevance in more than one type of attack (Moustafa & Slay, 2017; Janarthanan &
Zargari, 2017). So, given the 440K data set has nine categories of attack, that makes the
feature more valuable when the task is to detect any attack versus a particular type of
attack.
So, despite the poor performance of the DoS HMMs, the overall result still ended
up at an FPR of 0%. This highlights one of the benefits of a unanimous voting scheme.
All it takes is one classifier to disagree on an attack to negate incorrect decisions by other
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classifiers. HMM DS had a perfect TPR of 100% while HMM DD was virtually at
100%. But the excessive number of FPs significantly hurt both the FPR and the
Accuracy calculations. However, the ELMs had generally low FPs for the DoS data set.
Thus, when combined, there was a perfect FPR at only a slightly reduced Accuracy. It
should be noted that the MLP also had a perfect FPR of 0%. This is likely since the DoS
attacks used to create the data set have more distinctive patterns than other types of attack
and are less complex to model.
In terms of comparison to other research papers using UNSW-NB15, the
approach in this research compared very favorably to FPR and Accuracy metrics from
other research in Table 10. However, many researchers use different parts of UNSWNB15 and sometimes they are not clear on the parts they are using and the attributes
chosen. Thus, the comparisons to other research are indirect but still directional.
The most direct comparison from the table is for Igbe (2019) who used an
Artificial Intelligence System scheme on UNSW-NB15 Test and Train data set for just
Normal and DoS traffic. Igbe (2019) had achieved an FPR of 0.0134 with an Accuracy
of 0.9811. That compares to the FPR of 0.0000 and an Accuracy of 0.9669 for the ELM
plus HMM solution proposed by this research. So, while this solution achieved a better
FPR, the goal of the research, Igbe (2019) did have a slightly better Accuracy.
In terms of training time, the results of this research confirm the ELM trains very
quickly. As shown in Table 9, for the DoS data set, the ELM trained in 0.97 seconds of
CPU time. The MLP took 13058.10 CPU seconds on the same hardware. That is one
second to train for the ELM versus more than 3 hours for the MLP. The ELM combined
with the three HMM models took 19.24 seconds to train. The MLP, in this case,
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achieved the same 0% FPR as the combined model with a 0.3% increase in Accuracy.
The question is whether that is worth an extra three plus hours of CPU time which, of
course, would be application dependent. For the 440K data set, the MLP took over eight
hours of CPU time compared to just under three seconds for the ELM model. Other
research has shown that ELM needs up to four orders of magnitude in less time to train as
compared to ANNs using Back Propagation (Wang & Huang, 2005). This research
supports that conclusion.
The experiment with the number of hidden neurons to use for ELM confirms that
ELM is very stable across a wide range of hidden nodes but performance can degrade
with too few or too many neurons (Huang, Zhu, and Siew, 2006). As seen in figures six
through nine, the Accuracy of the system rises quickly as neurons are added from zero
but eventually levels off with smaller improvements as more neurons are added. The
FPR results tend to oscillate in a band once the system approaches a steady state as more
neurons are added.
Differences Among Algorithms
To summarize the difference in algorithm performance in terms of Accuracy and
FPR, the HMMs performed very well on the time-ordered 440K data set as shown in
Table 4. They had better FPRs individually than both MLP models that used 18 and 24
features as well as several of the 18 and 24 feature ELM models. The HMMs performed
much better than would be expected from their information gain merit alone as single
feature classifiers. This was most likely due to their detection of temporal patterns in the
data. This conclusion is further supported by the results of the non-time ordered DoS
Train & Test data set.
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In the DoS case, two of the three HMMs performed poorly as shown in Table 7 as
was anticipated from non-time ordered data. This performance is closer to what would
have been expected for a single feature classifier based on their information gain merit.
However, HMM DC performed relatively well. This is likely since it was a derived
feature involving the number of connections between the same destination address and
source port and that was a good indicator for detecting the type of DoS attacks used in the
data set.
The J48 DTs had mixed results with generally good performance on the 440K
data set where both the 18 and 24 feature versions had a better FPR than many of the
ELM models, some of the HMM models, and both of the MLP models. However, both
the MLP and all of the ELM models had a lower FPR than the J48 DT for the DoS data
set. And the MLP had one of the best performances on the DoS data set with a 0% FPR.
Overall, accounting for training time and results, this research supports prior
findings that ELM has shown its versatility to minimize false positives (Zong et al., 2013;
Fossaceca et al., 2015). ELM also had the lowest training times of any of the algorithms
as shown in Table 9 especially when compared to MLPs.
The one constant among algorithms is that the combined model using a
unanimous voting scheme had the best performance (or was tied for best performance)
for FPR. Lin et al. (2003) had previously demonstrated that a combination of classifiers
can result in a significant accuracy improvement.
Feature Selection Anomalies
For feature selection using Information Gain on the 440K data set, two data points
representing features stand out on Figures 4 and 5 which graph the Accuracy and FPR by
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number of features respectively. Both have a lower Accuracy and higher FPR than
would be indicated by a trend line. A similar anomaly is seen with the DoS data set for
two feature points as shown in Figures 8 and 9. While inconsequential, since none of the
features in question were chosen for the experiments, the most likely explanation is that
there was a slight variation in distributions between the respective test and training data
that caused some observations to skew which can affect the FPR. This phenomenon was
discussed in the statistical analysis of the UNSW-NB15 data set by Moustafa and Slay
(2016).

Summary
A primary purpose of this research was to extend promising emerging research
into ELM as a classifier, in conjunction with HMMs using a situation awareness
framework, to minimize false positives while maintaining accuracy. That goal was
achieved given the evaluation criteria.
More broadly, the intent was to further the use of ML based anomaly detection
techniques which have shown promise of detecting indications of novel cyber-attacks but
still typically generate more false positives than signature-based methods (Pao et al.,
2015). Incidentally, Valero León (2018), who created an ML based model using UNSWNB15 data, used a version of Snort with the then most recent signatures and achieved an
FPR of 30.66% compared to 8.57% with an anomaly-based method, DT, using the same
training and testing data. Hence, in this one instance, a signature-based approach
generated a much higher than expected FPR.
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Another research goal was to use a recent and relevant set of comprehensive
benchmark data, containing both cyber-attack and normal traffic. This research used
UNSW-NB15 (Moustafa & Slay, 2015) which achieved that goal. Researchers such as
Sommer and Paxton (2010), pointed out that the cybersecurity landscape has changed
significantly since the creation of the KDD99 data and that they do not consider
experiments that use older data sets such as KDD99 relevant anymore. And more
recently, Khammassi and Krichen (2017) had stated that the NIDS research community
now considers UNSW-NB15 a new benchmark data set to be used for evaluations of
IDSs. However, there is still a gap in the literature on ample published research for
comparison purposes which will likely take some time to close. But given that 17 papers
(as shown in Table 10) published between 2017 through mid-year 2019 provided
comparable results for FPR using UNSW-NB15, this gap is clearly closing.
However, given the needs of different researchers, more than 10 different portions
up to and including the full data set of UNSW-NB15 (as listed in the UNSW-NB15 data
set column) were used in the 17 papers cited. Different research also used different
feature selection methods. But these still provide a better comparison to the literature
than using results from older data sets such as KDD99.
This research also used the three situation awareness components defined by
Endsley (1988). The first stage, perception, was accomplished with a network-based
(NIDS) anomaly-detection engine for intrusion detection using an ELM as the primary
classifier.
The second stage, comprehension, which achieved the goal of further reducing
false positives and improving accuracy, was accomplished using a post processing

97
approach and implemented using HMMs. Treinen and Thurimella (2009) stated that
HMMs are very effective at detecting all types of attacks by acting as an anomaly
detector over a set of IDS alarms thus providing a low rate of false positives and high rate
of alarm reduction. The results in Tables 5 and 8 demonstrate that point with significant
reductions in FPR after combining the ELM results with the HMMs used for this
research. The temporal aspect from the HMMs provided better context around
interactions in time compared to a more traditional IDS approach that is just looking at a
single event in space.
The third phase, projection, was a decision informed by the perception and
comprehension stages, in space and time, on whether a given alert from the perception
stage should be put forth to a human operator or an automated action as an intrusion alert.
This was the combined output of the ELM and HMM classifiers.
An ELM was chosen as a classifier for the perception phase based on the positive
results as a classifier for IDS (Fossaceca et al., 2015). While ELM research only goes
back to Huang, Zhu, and Siew (2004) with the first IDS-based research from Cheng et al.
(2012), ELM has shown its versatility to minimize false positives (Zong et al., 2013).
But given the random initialization, ELM results can vary quite a bit, within a range, as
seen in Tables 4 and 7. To mitigate this, multiple runs can be considered as part of a
training and validation step prior to testing.
A combined approach was also used since prior research had shown positive
results in reducing false positives in IDS using post processing (Spathoulas & Katsikas,
2013b). Other hybrid results had yielded positive results such as using a KNN followed
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by ELM (Akusok et al., 2014) and a NB to HMM (Karthick et al., 2012) for malware
detection.
The primary evaluation metric for this research was FPR. Table 5 demonstrated
that the combined classifier did have the lowest or the same FPR including against an
MLP and J48 DT using the same testing and training data. The goal was that the addition
of the HMMs would reduce the FPR by at least 10% compared to the ELM classifier
alone and have an FPR of less than 0.6%. Those goals were exceeded.
This approach is novel as an extension of drawing upon several separate research
results by combining the positive aspects of each one. While there have been various
hybrids using either HMM or ELM for IDS, it is believed this approach was the first to
use a combination of an ELM with multiple HMMs for IDS. It is further unique in its use
of these classifiers in a situation awareness framework for network intrusion detection.

Implications
Given the increased stakes as a result of cyber-attacks, the need for faster and
more automated responses to indications of a potential cyber-attack is critical. Many
commercial IDSs and related systems are capable of blocking traffic in real-time, by
source IP address for example, based on intrusion alerts. However, as discussed, an
action based on a false positive with an automated response could deny resource access to
legitimate users or tasks that could be unacceptable based on the circumstance. Thus,
steps, such as demonstrated by this research, to further reduce false positives will help to
achieve better threat detection and response.
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Recommendations
While this research has highlighted the versatility of ELM and the ability to make
ELM better using situation awareness in conjunction with HMMs, there is ample
opportunity to extend this research to both further reduce FRP and improve accuracy.
One area of additional research would be to evaluate the feature selection process. This
research used both information gain (Kayacik et al., 2005) and CFS (Hall, 2000).
However, other studies that were cited, even those using similar feature selection
methods, have come up with widely varying results using different subsets of UNSWNB15. So, further research on feature selection methods would be warranted. Likewise,
a further evaluation of which features produce the best temporal results with HMMs,
beyond the features chosen, would likely provide other interesting insights.
The choice of testing and training data is another area for study. Different
research has used different portions of the UNSW-NB15 data set. Questions such as the
optimal training and testing data split, how varying the number of records impacts the
results, and how to best choose sequential data for time-series analysis could be further
studied.
Other researchers, as discussed, had also modified the ELM algorithm itself. For
example, Castaño et al. (2013) introduced PCA-ELM which eliminated the random
initialization of the weights and determined them based on a PCA of the training data.
So, another avenune of further research would be to evaluate variations of the ELM
algorithms and their impact on FPR. Variations of key ELM parameters such as the
optimal number of hidden neurons and the best activation function could also be further
explored.
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For the HMM classifiers, experiments could be done to determine if more than
two or three HMM classifiers improve the results. For the third phase of projection, this
research used a unanimous voting scheme where a record was marked as an attack only if
the ELM and the HMM models agreed. Variations on this could also be explored such as
by weighting the results from each model and using discrete thresholds for the ELM and
HMMs instead of binary ones for each model.
Another avenue of inquiry would be to determine how ELM, or a similar
combination with HMMs, could better reduce the FNR while also maintaining Accuracy.
This could help to better ferret out indications of compromise which might not alarm.
Overall, this research provided promising results and has hopefully provided insights for
additional exploration and improvement opportunities.
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Appendix A
UNSW-NB15 Features Description for Experiment A (Full 2.54M)
(Moustafa & Slay, 2015)
Table 11: UNSW-NB15 Features Description
No.

Name

Type

Description
Flow Features

1
2
3
4
5

srcip
sport
dstip
dsport
proto

nominal
integer
nominal
integer
nominal

Source IP address
Source port number
Destination IP address
Destination port number
Transaction protocol
Basic Features

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

state
dur
sbytes
dbytes
sttl
dttl
sloss
dloss
service
Sload
Dload
Spkts
Dpkts

nominal
Float
Integer
Integer
Integer
Integer
Integer
Integer
nominal
Float
Float
integer
integer

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

swin
dwin
stcpb
dtcpb
smeansz
dmeansz
trans_depth
res_bdy_len

integer
integer
integer
integer
integer
integer
integer
integer

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Sjit
Djit
Stime
Ltime
Sintpkt
Dintpkt
tcprtt
synack
ackdat

Float
Float
Timestamp
Timestamp
Float
Float
Float
Float
Float

36
37
38
39
40

is_sm_ips_ports
ct_state_ttl
ct_flw_http_mthd
is_ftp_login
ct_ftp_cmd

Binary
Integer
Integer
Binary
integer

Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol, e.g. ACC, CLO, CON, ECO, ECR, FIN, INT, MAS,
PAR, REQ, RST, TST, TXD, URH, URN, and (-) (if not used state)
Record total duration
Source to destination transaction bytes
Destination to source transaction bytes
Source to destination time to live value
Destination to source time to live value
Source packets retransmitted or dropped
Destination packets retransmitted or dropped
http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, ftp-data ,irc and (-) if not much used service
Source bits per second
Destination bits per second
Source to destination packet count
Destination to source packet count
Content Features
Source TCP window advertisement value
Destination TCP window advertisement value
Source TCP base sequence number
Destination TCP base sequence number
Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the src
Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the dst
Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of http request/response transaction
Actual uncompressed content size of the data transferred from the serverís http service.
Time Features
Source jitter (mSec)
Destination jitter (mSec)
record start time
record last time
Source interpacket arrival time (mSec)
Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec)
TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of ísynackí and íackdatí.
TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN and the SYN_ACK packets.
TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN_ACK and the ACK packets.
Additional Generated Features
If source (1) and destination (3) IP addresses equal and port numbers (2)(4) equal then, this variable
takes value 1 else 0
No. for each state (6) according to specific range of values for source/destination time to live (10) (11).
No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in http service.
If the ftp session is accessed by user and password then 1 else 0.
No of flows that has a command in ftp session.
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No.

Name

Type

Description

41 ct_srv_src

integer

Connection Features
No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and source address (1) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).

42 ct_srv_dst

integer

No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and destination address (3) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).

43 ct_dst_ltm

integer

No. of connections of the same destination address (3) in 100 connections according to the last time
(26).

44 ct_src_ ltm

integer

45 ct_src_dport_ltm

integer

No. of connections of the same source address (1) in 100 connections according to the last time (26).
No of connections of the same source address (1) and the destination port (4) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).

46 ct_dst_sport_ltm

integer

No of connections of the same destination address (3) and the source port (2) in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).

47 ct_dst_src_ltm

integer

48 attack_cat
49 Label

nominal
binary

No of connections of the same source (1) and the destination (3) address in in 100 connections
according to the last time (26).
Labelled Features
The name of each attack category. In this data set, nine categories: Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS
Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Worms
0 for normal and 1 for attack records
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Appendix B
Information Gain Analysis of UNSW-NB15 Features for Experiment A
Table 12: Experiment A: Information Gain Analysis of UNSW NB-15 Features
Rank

Attribute #

Attribute Name

Merit

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

8
3
1
37
10
15
23
11
9
24
7
32
16
18
46
45
33
34
35
4
31
6
43
2
44
17
27
28
47
42
41
13
12
5
19
21
22
20
29
30
14
26
25
36
38
40
39

sbytes
dstip
srcip
ct_state_ttl
sttl
Sload
smeansz
dttl
dbytes
dmeansz
dur
Dintpkt
Dload
Dpkts
ct_dst_sport_ltm
ct_src_dport_ltm
tcprtt
synack
ackdat
dsport
Sintpkt
state
ct_dst_ltm
sport
ct_src_ ltm
Spkts
Sjit
Djit
ct_dst_src_ltm
ct_srv_dst
ct_srv_src
dloss
sloss
proto
swin
stcpb
dtcpb
dwin
Stime
Ltime
service
res_bdy_len
trans_depth
is_sm_ips_ports
ct_flw_http_mthd
ct_ftp_cmd
is_ftp_login

0.637
0.629
0.618
0.614
0.593
0.563
0.541
0.330
0.329
0.303
0.290
0.278
0.274
0.261
0.258
0.214
0.212
0.209
0.209
0.204
0.201
0.201
0.196
0.192
0.167
0.165
0.161
0.160
0.156
0.154
0.146
0.141
0.133
0.122
0.083
0.082
0.082
0.082
0.081
0.078
0.059
0.031
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Appendix C
HMM Parameters for Experiment A
For HMM S
Initial estimates:
estTR =
0.9776
0.2503
0.0769

0.0070
0.2610
0.0596

0.0154
0.4887
0.8635

estE =
Columns 1 through 8
0.0027
0.0021
0.0014

0.0011
0
0

0.0000
0
0

0.7722
0
0

0.1919
0
0

0.0046 0.0004
0.0134 0
0.0737 0

0.0028
0
0

0.7804
0
0

0.1939
0
0

0.0022 0.0004
0.3591 0
0.0169 0

0.0029
0
0

Columns 9 through 11
0.0000
0
0

0.0240 0.0000
0.9843 0.0002
0.9249 0

After Baum-Welch algorithm:
estTR1 =
0.9703
0.4876
0.0474

0.0200 0.0097
0.4560 0.0564
0.0113 0.9413

estE2 =
Columns 1 through 8
0.0008 0.0012
0.0562 0
0.0000 0

0.0000
0
0
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Columns 9 through 11
0.0000
0
0

0.0181 0.0000
0.5843 0.0004
0.9831 0

For HMM C
Initial estimates:
estTRC =
0.9776
0.2503
0.0769

0.0070 0.0154
0.2610 0.4887
0.0596 0.8635

estEC =
0.9723
0.0030
0.0040

0.0174
0.5363
0.1179

0.0064
0.4453
0.8735

0.0021
0
0.0010

0.0018
0.0154
0.0036

0.9812 0.0128 0.0032 0.0023
0.0000 0.8028 0.1434 0
0.0001 0.0399 0.9598 0.0002

0.0005
0.0538
0.0001

After Baum-Welch algorithm:
estTRC1 =
0.9710
0.4577
0.0439

0.0206
0.4734
0.0138

0.0084
0.0689
0.9423

estEC1 =
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Appendix D
UNSW-NB15 Features Description for Experiment B (Train and Test)
(Moustafa & Slay, 2015; Moustafa & Slay, 2016)
Table 13: UNSW-NB15 Features Description for the Train and Test Data Set
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No.

Name

Type

Description

0 id
1 dur

integer
Float

unique id number
Record total duration

2 proto
3 service

nominal
nominal

Transaction protocol
http,
ftp, smtp,
,irc and
(-) if not
used
service
Indicates
to the ssh,
statedns,
and ftp-data
its dependent
protocol,
e.g.much
ACC,
CLO,
CON, ECO, ECR,

4 state
5 spkts

nominal
integer

FIN, INT, MAS, PAR, REQ, RST, TST, TXD, URH, URN, and (-) (if not used state)
Source to destination packet count

dpkts
sbytes
dbytes
rate
sttl
dttl
sload
dload
sloss
dloss
sintpkt
dintpkt
sjit
djit
swin
stcpb
dtcpb
dwin
tcprtt
synack
ackdat
smean
dmean

integer
Integer
Integer
Float
Integer
Integer
Float
Float
Integer
Integer
Float
Float
Float
Float
integer
integer
integer
integer
Float
Float
Float
integer
integer

Destination to source packet count
Source to destination transaction bytes
Destination to source transaction bytes
rate
Source to destination time to live value
Destination to source time to live value
Source bits per second
Destination bits per second
Source packets retransmitted or dropped
Destination packets retransmitted or dropped
Source interpacket arrival time (mSec)
Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec)
Source jitter (mSec)
Destination jitter (mSec)
Source TCP window advertisement value
Source TCP base sequence number
Destination TCP base sequence number
Destination TCP window advertisement value
TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of ísynackí and íackdatí.
TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN and the SYN_ACK packets.
TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN_ACK and the ACK packets.
Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the src
Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the dst

29 trans_depth

integer

Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of http request/response transaction

30 response_body_len integer

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

31 ct_srv_src

integer

Actual uncompressed content size of the data transferred from the serverís http service.
No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and source address (1) in 100
connections according to the last time (26).

32 ct_state_ttl

Integer

No. for each state (6) according to specific range of values for source/destination time
to live (10) (11).

33 ct_dst_ltm

integer

No. of connections of the same destination address (3) in 100 connections according to
the last time (26).

34 ct_src_dport_ltm

integer

No of connections of the same source address (1) and the destination port (4) in 100
connections according to the last time (26).

35 ct_dst_sport_ltm

integer

No of connections of the same destination address (3) and the source port (2) in 100
connections according to the last time (26).

36 ct_dst_src_ltm

integer

No of connections of the same source (1) and the destination (3) address in in 100
connections according to the last time (26).

37 is_ftp_login

Binary

If the ftp session is accessed by user and password then 1 else 0.

38 ct_ftp_cmd

integer

No of flows that has a command in ftp session.

39 ct_flw_http_mthd

Integer

No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in http service.

40 ct_src_ ltm

integer

No. of connections of the same source address (1) in 100 connections according to the
last time (26).

41 ct_srv_dst

integer

No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and destination address (3) in 100
connections according to the last time (26).

42 is_sm_ips_ports

Binary

If source (1) and destination (3) IP addresses equal and port numbers (2)(4) equal
then, this variable takes value 1 else 0

43 attack_cat
44 Label

nominal
binary

The name of each attack category. In this data set, nine categories: Fuzzers, Analysis,
Backdoors, DoS Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Worms
0 for normal and 1 for attack records
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Appendix E
Information Gain Analysis for Experiment B

Table 14: Experiment B: Information Gain Analysis of UNSW NB-15 Features
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Attribute #
7
27
2
12
8
9
1
28
11
32
10
17
13
6
4
16
25
24
5
26
35
19
14
18
15
20
21
22
23
34
36
3
30
41
31
33
40
42
38
37
39
29

Attribute Name
sbytes
smean
proto
sload
dbytes
rate
dur
dmean
dttl
ct_state_ttl
sttl
dinpkt
dload
dpkts
state
sinpkt
synack
tcprtt
spkts
ackdat
ct_dst_sport_ltm
djit
sloss
sjit
dloss
swin
stcpb
dtcpb
dwin
ct_src_dport_ltm
ct_dst_src_ltm
service
response_body_len
ct_srv_dst
ct_srv_src
ct_dst_ltm
ct_src_ltm
is_sm_ips_ports
ct_ftp_cmd
is_ftp_login
ct_flw_http_mthd
trans_depth

Merit
0.546
0.479
0.453
0.442
0.356
0.356
0.346
0.323
0.316
0.305
0.300
0.287
0.285
0.283
0.244
0.229
0.188
0.188
0.183
0.179
0.165
0.164
0.157
0.154
0.152
0.118
0.111
0.111
0.111
0.061
0.055
0.051
0.038
0.035
0.031
0.026
0.021
0.012
0.003
0.003
0.001
0.000
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Appendix F
HMM Parameters for Experiment B

HMM S
estTRC =
0.9759
0
0.1100

0
0
0

0.0241
0
0.8900

estEC =
Columns 1 through 9
0.0511
0
0.0059

0.0011
0
0

0.0000 0 0.7046
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0.0001
0
0

0.0387
0
0.1024

0.0006
0
0

Columns 10 through 13
0.0032
0
0

0.0000
0
0

0.2005 0.0000
0
0
0.8909 0.0008

After Baum-Welch Algorithm
estTRC1 =
0.9999
0 0.0001
0 1.0000
0
0.0001
0 0.9999
estEC1 =
Columns 1 through 9
0.0035
0

0.0016
0

0.0000
0

0.0001
0

0.9663
0

0.0001
0

0.0001
0

0.0000
0

0.0008
0

110
0.1017

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.1248 0

Columns 10 through 13
0.0044
0
0

0.0000
0
0

0.0231 0.0000
0
0
0.7732 0.0004

HMM C
estTRC =
0.9759
0
0.1100

0 0.0241
0 0
0 0.8900

estEC =
Columns 1 through 9
0.9201
0
0.4603

0.0721
0
0.2644

0.0035
0
0.1651

0.0008
0
0.0646

0.0003 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0192 0.0034 0.0040 0.0098 0.0044

Columns 10 through 16
0
0
0.0049

0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
0
0
0
0
0
0

After Baum-Welch Algorithm:
estTRC1 =
0.9924 0
0.0076
0
1.0000 0
0.0281 0
0.9719
estEC1 =
Columns 1 through 9

0.0007
0
0

0.0007
0
0

0.0008
0
0

111
0.9712
0
0.3421

0.0241 0.0010 0.0003
0
0
0
0.4126 0.1495 0.0568

0.0002
0
0.0167

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0029 0.0034 0.0083 0.0037

0.0007
0
0

0.0007
0
0

Columns 10 through 16
0
0
0.0041

0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.0009
0
0

HMM D
estTRC =
0.9759
0
0.1100

0
0
0

0.0241
0
0.8900

estEC =
0.1205
0
0.7951

0.7046
0
0

0 0.0000
0 0
0 0

0
0
0

0.0013
0
0.0181

0.1736
0
0.1868

0 0.0000
0 0
0 0

After Baum-Welch Algorithm
estTRC1 =
0.9998
0 0.0002
0 1.0000
0
0.0002
0 0.9998
estEC1 =
0.0180
0
0.5741

0.9668
0
0

0.0001
0
0

0.0001
0
0

0.0001
0
0

0.0017 0.0133 0.0001
0
0
0
0.0081 0.4178
0

0.0001
0
0
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